# Broun <br> NIEW 

A PhillipCapital India Publication

pg 4. Cover story

pg 29. VIDARBHA: A tale of two economies
pg 49. Indian Economy - Trend indicators

INDIA'S BASMATI

## PhillipCapital

GROUND VIEW - PREVIOUS ISSUES


1st Oct 2015 Issue 6


1st June 2015 Issue 4


1st Feb 2015 Issue 2


1st July 2015 Issue 5


1st Apr 2015 Issue 3


1st Jan 2015 Issue 1

## LETTER FROM THE MANAGING DIRECTOR

Trust you had a safe Deepawali!

India accounts for $80 \%$ of the global trade in basmati and the consumption has compounded at $20 \%$ in the past five years, driven by growth in domestic and export markets. The size of India's basmati industry is Rs 420bn, of which exports account for a large chunk at Rs 300bn. India has taken away a substantial share from Pakistan - its only competitor - due to superior quality and higher production. In this issue, our Agri Inputs analyst, Gauri Anand, examines the prospects of India's basmati rice industry, buyer behaviour, and price sensitivity. She has also attempted to answer questions such as why the 'eat out' culture is leading to higher basmati offtake, why the Middle East will consume higher amounts of basmati, and why cropping patterns would shift away from basmati next year. She predicts that acreages will shift to more remunerative crops leading to higher basmati realisations over the medium term. Despite being in the B2C segment with strong underlying growth, the sector's valuations remain attractive. All of this would perhaps result in resurgence of private equity interest in basmati industry.

This issue also features a different insight into Vidarbha's economy through the rising aspirations and premiumisation in automobile sales. The story, penned by our auto team - Dhawal Doshi and Nitesh Sharma - along with Ashvin Patil - details the tale of two economies within Vidarbha (one bleak and the other bright) through the trends in the automotive industry in this region.

Cheers!

## CONTENTS



## 4. COVER STORY:

 India's Basmati: Always in flavour.Ground View visited parts of Punjab and Haryana to get a reality check

29. VIDARBHA: a tale of two economies
49. Indian Economy - Trend indicators

## 51. PhillipCapital Coverage Universe: <br> Valuation Summary

## Vineet



## COVER STORY



India accounts for $80 \%$ of the world's trade in Basmati - the country exported Basmati worth US\$ 4.5 bn (or Rs. 300bn) in FY15, 12\% of its overall agricultural-produce exports. Almost half of the country's basmati production is exported to the Middle East, the United States, UK, and Australia. Ground View visited parts of Punjab and Haryana (that account for $82 \%$ of India's basmati production) to get a reality check from the growers, artiyas (commission agents), millers, and companies. It has also tried to examine the prospects of India's basmati rice industry, buyer behaviour, and price sensitivity. GV has also attempted to answer questions such as why the 'eat out' culture is leading to higher basmati offtake, why the Middle East will consume higher amounts of basmati, possible reasons why Pakistan's basmati variety is losing market share to the Indian one, and why cropping patterns shifting away from basmati this year (and next) will lead to a price surge.

Currently, the industry is under stress with weak export demand and excess supply; however, the pressure is likely to alleviate as demand picks up and cropping patterns shift away from basmati next year, leading to a price surge. Domestic basmati demand (pegged at $\sim$ Rs. 120bn) has been growing at $15 \%$ in volume terms over the last five years as branded products are accepted more and with the growth of food retail. This trend should sustain, going by the changing lifestyles of Indians, higher propensity to spend, convenience, and rising brand awareness. A rebound in crude oil prices and Iran lifting the import ban on rice from India could drive export demand for Indian basmati. Basmati rice players have seen big deals and private equity investment over the last five years. However, these investments have flagged in the last two year. With India's rice production almost static for last four years, its 12 mmt rice exports could be lower leading to a spike in prices - this could result in resurgence in interest of the private equity players in the coming years. As a b2C category, integrated branded basmati rice companies are likely to make good secular investments.
pg. 6 Basmati unique to Indian sub-continent
The largest producer
pg. 12 The current price collapse
The price collapse is short lived
pg. 17 Rise in food retailing
Promising long-term outlook
pg. 22 Industry prospects
Secular consumer staples investment theme

BY GAURI ANAND

## BASMATI UNIQUE TO INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

## India: The largest producer

|t is only possible to grow basmati rice in precise climatic conditions, soil quality, and temperature - and this is present exclusively in the Indo-Gangetic area of the Himalayas. Basmati is also a legally protected trade name - this prevents any rice grown outside of the Indo-Gangetic area from being called basmati.
Basmati rice has a typical pandan-like (pandanus amaryllifolius leaf) flavour (nutty) caused by the aroma compound 2-acetyl-1-pyrroline. Farmers in the northern parts of India, especially at the foot of the Himalayas have been growing this scented rice for centuries. The supremacy of Basmati over other varieties is mainly due to its unique and delicately balanced characteristics such as superfine (long and slender) kernels, exquisite aroma, sweet taste, soft texture, and delicate curvature, all of which makes it excellent for cooking.


## HISTORY TITBIT

Basmati rice has been favoured by emperors and praised by poets for hundreds of years. In the olden times, this rice variety was grown only in special fields for kings, treasured and guarded by nobles. Ordinary people were not allowed in the vicinity of these fields and taking away basmati grain was a punishable offence.

The size of the global rice industry is approximately 477 mmt , or US\$ 285bn, of which basmati accounts for only $2.6 \%$ at 11.5 mmt or US\$ 7.3 bn . India accounts for $\sim 80 \%$ of basmati produced or 9 mmt (US\$ 5.7bn) and Pakistan for 20\%. Although basmati represents a small part of India's US\$ 40bn agriculture and allied-products exports, it offers the country high product visibility in the world market. The basmati industry size is about Rs. 420bn - Rs. 120bn domestic and Rs. 300bn exports.

The acreage under basmati jumped 30\% in FY15

|  | FY14 |  | FY15 |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Area mn hect | Rice | Basmati | Rice | Basmati | \% GROWTH <br> IN BASMATI <br> AREA |
| Punjab | 2.74 | 0.59 | 2.79 | 0.73 | $24 \%$ |
| Haryana | 1.16 | 0.71 | 1.13 | 0.78 | $10 \%$ |
| Western UP | 1.56 | 0.32 | 1.57 | 0.60 | $88 \%$ |
| Uttarakhand | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.13 | 0.02 | $22 \%$ |
| HP | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | $-10 \%$ |
| J\&K | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.04 | $-6 \%$ |
| Total | 5.79 | 1.68 | 5.81 | 2.17 | $29 \%$ |

## India and Pakistan are the sole basmati producers

In India, basmati is grown in Haryana, Punjab, western Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and J\&K. In Pakistan, basmati is grown in the Punjab province. This is generally a kharif (May to November) crop with sowing season starting from May-June and harvesting season ending in October-November. Earlier, farmers preferred to grow non-basmati paddy variety due to the minimum support price (MSP) and relatively higher yield. However after the introduction of PUSA 1121 (trade term: duplicate basmati) the economics favoured cultivation of basmati - as a result, the area under basmati cultivation nearly doubled in the past six years. The other approved Indian varieties include Dehradun, P3 Punjab, 386 Haryana, Kasturi (Baran, Rajasthan), Basmati 198, Basmati 217,

Basmati 370, Bihar, Kasturi, Mahi Suganda, Pusa 1121, and Pusa 1509.

The government introduced the new variety, Pusa 1509, in FY14 - its yields are relatively higher and it is a short-duration crop (lowers crop cycle time by 30 days and saves 5-6 irrigations). Today, Pusa 1509 and Pusa 1121 occupy almost $85-90 \%$ of the gross sown area under basmati in the ratio of 25:75. However, Pusa 1509 has limited acceptance in the international market; therefore, it is priced at a discount to Pusa 1121. India produces about 9 mmt of basmati rice annually, of which around 3.8 mmt is exported. Demand for Indian basmati remains strong in the Middle East, Iran, and other traditional markets. Local traders (in the APMC wholesale market in Vashi) believe that with an improvement in India's economy, local consumption of basmati is steadily rising. Basmati rice fetches a good price in the international market. With the opening up of new markets (Japan, Korea, and Indonesia under WTO regime) and also with the government of India removing minimum export price, the export of Indian rice increased tremendously. China has decided to import Indian Basmati rice - this is likely to increase the demand for Indian basmati. Of the total basmati rice production ( 9 mmt ) in FY15, head rice (full-grain) recovery is around 6.3 mmt ( $75 \%$ ) whereas the remaining is broken rice ( 2.7 mmt ). Generally, a major portion of head rice ( 6.3 mmt ) is sold in the export market and fetches better average price realisation per kilogram. In India, both head rice and broken rice are consumed - this lowers the average realisation in the domestic market. As the export market is a full-grain market, its realisations are better. Indian basmati exports have compounded at 13\% in FY10-15. During the same period, the domestic basmati market has compounded at a higher rate of $15 \%$.

|  | NON-BASMATI |  | BASMATI* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | TRADITIONAL | PUSA 1121 | PUSA 1509 |
| Yield | Quintal/acre | 30 | 9 | 18 | 20 |
| Paddy Realization | Rs./kg | 14.5 | 25 | 25 | 22 |
| Revenue | Rs./acre | 43,500 | 22,500 | 45,000 | 44,000 |
| Cost | Rs./acre | 27,720 | 8,840 | 17,680 | 19,294 |
| Profit | Rs./acre | 15,780 | 13,660 | 27,320 | 24,706 |
|  |  | *assumed mid cycle realization of Rs. $25 / \mathrm{kg}$ for Basmati variety |  |  |  |



The branded basmati rice market has compounded $15 \%$ and accounts for $75 \%$ of India's branded rice market

## India's domestic basmati industry

The size of the domestic industry is pegged at US\$ 2.4bn or Rs. 120bn. Basmati accounts for $75 \%$ of the branded rice market. The size of the basmati industry could touch US\$ 3.5bn by FY17 (industry estimates). The main growth drivers of branded rice are convenience of procuring clean rice packs from stores, rising income levels, urbanisation, rise in food retail, and brand awareness. Consumption of branded rice is growing in both southern and northern India. However, grains sold in the south are generally smaller and are mainly non-basmati.
Growth in the modern retail segment boosted the branded rice market. As per industry estimates, the retail segment has been growing at 15-20\% annually, and the growth rate is likely to jump to $25 \%$ by 2017. Last few years have seen many traders and millers launching their own rice brands - the latest entrant is Adani with the Fortune brand - this underscores the potential of the branded rice market in India. According to a report in ET, branded rice can command about $33 \%$ premium over loose rice at the retail level and a modern retailer can earn a $20 \%$ margin vs. $12 \%$ for loose rice.
Unbranded basmati (loose basmati) accounts for 74\% of total basmati sales in the domestic market, lower than $86 \%$ in FY11 due to growing awareness - the potential to tap the conversion (consumer uptrading) is still huge.

Branded basmati players are becoming consumer focused by improving their offerings (value to premium range with attractive packaging and trade promotions) and leveraging existing brands by hiring brand ambassadors such as Amitabh Bacchan and Sanjeev Kapoor. Incumbents are also expanding their sales and distribution network and are making their products available to all conventional and modern-trade formats. To capitalise on rising distribution platform and as an economic rationale for expanding distribution network, they are broadening their product offerings (to wheat, wheat flour, pulses, sweets, and savouries).

Basmati accounts for $75 \%$ of the branded rice market



"Income growth, rising number of nuclear families, growing 'eat out' culture, and greater participation of women in the workforce are fundamental factors driving demand for packaged rice

- Rakesh Mehrotra, CFO, KRBL
"Brand awareness has increased more at the wholesale level than at the retail level. About 20 years ago, we used to get rice from different states in gunny bags, with just the weight mentioned on it without any brand name. Now all the rice in bulk comes branded."
- Sunil, a basmati rice trader at Vashi (Navi Mumbai) AMPC market.
"I prefer buying packaged rice because of the convenience and ease of procuring clean rice as opposed to the laborious task of cleaning (checking for stones and impurities) when purchased from wholesalers or local kirana's (corner stores)."
- Mrs Shubhashree, homemaker, Chennai.
"Although traditionally we consume a lot of ponni and kolam variety, occasionally we cook basmati for its aroma, long grains, and fluffy non-sticky texture. We have tried many varieties but we prefer Kohinoor Gold basmati.
- Ms Sadhna, student, Chennai.
"Kohinoor and India Gate basmati rice are famous brands in Qatar. Some varieties from Pakistan are also available in the market. Approximately 30\% of Qatar's population comprises of Indians and Pakistani's and the locals also use it (basmati) regularly."
- Parameshwaran, NRI, Qatar.
"I have cooked Pakistani basmati rice the length of the rice is short but it's very tasty and high in aroma, also it usually takes less time to cook."
- Mrs Revathi, a homemaker from Coimbatore.
Source: Company, PhillipCapital India Research

Rice exports tops the agricultural and allied sector exports from India (US\$ bn)
 India basmati consumption on the rise (in mmt)


Huge potential: Unbranded to Branded rice switch


## India's basmati export market

Among the food grains exported from India, basmati is an important commodity. In the 1980s, most Indian basmati went to the USSR and very little was exported to other countries. However, by the end of 1980s, the export share of the USSR decreased slightly while the share of other countries, particularly to Saudi Arabia, increased substantially. Indian basmati was exported to Saudi Arabia in considerable quantities by the end of 1997-98 and USSR's share had gone down considerably by then. During the past few years, basmati export has been growing steadily - it touched 3.7 mmt in FY15 from 0.8 mmt in 2003 - on robust demand from traditional markets in west Asia. Middle East accounts for $83 \%$ of overall basmati exports followed by UK, US, and Australia, which account for the next $8 \%$. Iran alone has been importing $>40 \%$ of the total basmati exported from India in 2014; however, Iran's ban in November 2014 on rice imports from India (allegedly to protect its rice producers) has seen its share fall to $26 \%$ and pushed Indian basmati prices lower. However, a part of this excess supply has been readily consumed by the Saudi Arabian market.

| 000 mt | Exports in mt | CAGR(FY10-15)\% | In value(\$/mn) | CAGR (FY10-15)\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Saudi Arabia | 967 | 9 | 1.19 | 11.3 |
| Iran | 936 | 21 | 1.11 | 20.7 |
| UAE | 279 | (15) | 0.31 | (13.6) |
| Iraq | 235 | 102 | 0.26 | 102.7 |
| Kuwait | 166 | 4 | 0.25 | 2.9 |
| Yemen Republic | 174 | 23 | 0.20 | 59.4 |
| Qatar | 124 | 85 | 0.19 | 48.1 |
| Other ME nations | 215 | 37 | 0.26 | 25.8 |
| Overall Middle East | 3,097 | 11 | 3.76 | 12 |
| USA | 89 | 28 | 0.13 | 32.51 |
| UK | 136 | 30 | 0.15 | 28.99 |
| Australia | 27 | 43 | 0.04 | 43.95 |
| Total | 3,702 | 13 | 4.52 | 14.5 |

Source: Company, PhillipCapital India Research


Saudi rice consumption has compounded at 5\% in CY06-14



## Saudi Arabia - the new large consumer

Saudi Arabia has no domestic rice production - the country depends fully on imports. Most Saudi nationals include rice as a major part of their daily diet. Most of the 10 mn expatriates (from the Indian subcontinent and other Far East countries) living in Saudi Arabia (population 30.8 mn , growing at $3 \%$ annually) are large consumers of rice. Basmati is the most popular rice variety in this country - Saudi Arabia imported about 1.4 mmt of rice in FY15 and India remained the dominant rice supplier with its share steadily rising to $73 \%$ in FY15 from $56 \%$ in FY10; Pakistan's share is $12 \%$, US 7\%, and Thailand 5\%. Rice imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to grow by $7 \%$ in FY16 to 1.5 mmt , mostly from increased supplies of Indian rice. Traditionally, Iran imported a third of Indian basmati. However, its ban on rice imports has made Indian rice cheaper and readily available for the Saudi market. The Iranian ban has also caused rice stocks in Pakistan to rise and pushed down export prices as well. The Saudi rice market is very price-sensitive. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia's demand for US rice is likely to decline significantly this year due to more price-competitive export offers from India, Pakistan, and Thailand (which also has excess rice stocks).

## THE CURRENT PRICE COLLAPSE



Source: PhillipCapital India Research
Weak basmati paddy prices have affected not only farmers but farm labour also adversely

## The price collapse is short lived

Surplus production for five consecutive years buoyed rice stocks in the open market. Because of this glut, premium rice varieties (such as basmati) saw their prices falling throughout this season. Some varieties of rice have seen prices almost halving. Growers and stockists believe that these varieties have led to huge losses. Despite the subdued outlook, area under basmati cultivation is still likely to have risen $5 \%$, as it is more remunerative and traditionally has fetched higher returns (vs. common paddy) for farmers. A good crop and static exports have led to chaos in the
basmati market lately. In CY11, basmati prices were suppressed due to higher production, but in CY12 production declined due to adverse weather conditions. As a result, CY13-14 prices were at around Rs. 40/kg up from Rs. 21/kg in the previous year. Firm prices over the last three years has led to higher acreage (CAGR of $17 \%$ in FY14-16 to 2.2 mn hectares in FY16 from 1.6 mn in FY14), leading to higher availability and pushing prices lower. This, along with Iran's ban on imports from India and a fall in crude oil prices and other commodities has led to plunging prices of basmati.

The prices of PUSA-1121 basmati were at Rs. $25-30 / \mathrm{kg}$ in the past three years (Rs 60/kg at peak) had plunged to Rs. 14/kg before settling at Rs. $17.5-18.5 / \mathrm{kg}$ this year. The going rate for the less-preferred 1509 variety is anywhere between Rs. 11-13/kg against last year's Rs. 25/kg. However, thanks to the Union government's recent order to procure Pusa 1509 from Punjab at MSP rates announced for common paddy (i.e., Rs. 14.5/kg), some supply should get taken out of the market, which could stabilise prices.
"Basmati prices (that were firm for the past three years) have fallen even below the normal paddy variety. Sowing basmati has cost us heavy. After suffering losses between Rs. 10,000-15,000 per acre, we have decided not to repeat our mistake."

- Gurnam Singh, a very old progressive farmer in Ambala, Punjab.
"Most farmers felt the only way out before the Punjab government was to either support basmati growers with a Minimum Support Price or come up with export and milling policies. The major problem is that basmati growers of Punjab solely depend on private players."
- Pushpinder Singh, a farmer.



Analyst Gauri Anand in conversation with Gurnam Singh, an experienced progressive farmer from Ambala

## Ground View interviews

## basmati paddy farmers in Punjab

Ground View interviewed some basmati paddy farmers who are currently in distress as the prices have plunged even below the common paddy variety - an artiya (commission agent) from Ambala district blamed the export crunch and the excess supply of the famous PUSA 1121 variety of basmati, which is now fetching Rs. 12-17/kg vs. the common paddy variety at Rs. $14.5 / \mathrm{kg}$. Basmati prices in the past three years were at Rs. $18-28 / \mathrm{kg}$ and had peaked at Rs. $55-60 / \mathrm{kg}$. Plunging basmati prices and rising input costs have led to serious losses for farmers (Rs 10,000-15,000/acre) and some farmers that GV spoke to have even decided to shift to the normal paddy variety in the next season.


Processed Rice Storage Area


Testing lab at the plant


GV's visit to KRBL's site in Dhuri, Punjab


"Most of the farmers are indebted to 'artiyas (commission agents)'; therefore, they are averse to risk. A switch to any other crop other than paddy is a risk. Creation of cold storage, forward linkages with agroprocessing industries, and rural employment, would reduce dependence on agriculture and will help the farmers get out of the debt trap,"

- Jagraj Dandi, JS Statistics,

Dept. of Agriculture, Govt. of Haryana.
"Excess production has led to a huge pileup with exporters. We are advising farmers against cultivating basmati. they will fetch good prices only if annual basmati arrivals in the markets remain at around 2 mmt in Punjab,"

- Ravinder Singh Cheema, President of the Punjab Arhtiya Association and Vice-Chairman of the Punjab Mandi Board.

Falling prices of basmati have landed many UAE traders in a soup, with most defaulting on their credit obligations. India Pusa 1121 is now being sold at US\$ 750/MT vs. US\$ 1,2001,300/MT at the beginning of the year, while Pakistan basmati prices have plunged by $40 \%$ to US\$ 730-750/MT from US\$ 1000/MT in FY15.
"Thai rice is not very famous in the Middle East, it has a larger market in the US, Senegal, Hong Kong, and China. Consumers here tell us that while it matches basmati in terms of fragrance, it becomes starchy after cooking."

- A retailer in Dubai
"Famous Pakistan basmati brands in Dubai are Falak and Mehran. These brands used to be at a slight premium to Daawat or India Gate. While Falak prices in super markets have corrected to Dh 28 (from Dh 45) for a 5 kg bag. Daawat and India Gate prices have sustained at Dh 45-60 for five kgs,"




## The outlook looks promising

"Basmati rice is primarily produced in India and Pakistan, with India being the larger producer. The product is consumed a lot in the Middle East and West Asia. As that region is aspiring for food security, they will look at long-term and sustainable footholds, not only in basmati rice but also other staple grains and pulses,"

- Rakesh Mehrotra, CFO, KRBL.

The nervousness led by excess supply and plunging prices is likely to be short lived, as globally, adverse weather has led to a cut in volume estimates for rice (by the USDA) for FY16 - this should push prices higher over the next few years. With softening commodity prices, basmati realisation has fallen (as with other commodities); rice exports grew 17\% in April-August 2015 in quantity terms, underscoring that the demand has improved in response to falling prices.

Industry estimates peg basmati demand (Rs. 120bn) to have seen a CAGR of $12 \%$ in 2001-14 (vs. 1.2\% for rice), led by strong demand from both domestic and international markets. With a rise in income levels, shift in consumer preference (to branded rice from unbranded), rising 'eat out' culture, and expansion of organized retail in India, consumption of branded products has been rising. Domestic demand is likely to grow at 12-15\% over the next two years vs. $15 \%$ in the last five years. Export demand looks healthy - a rebound in crude oil price and any decision by Iran to lift the import ban on rice from India will drive demand further.


For many years, private equity funds and venture capitalists did not have agribusiness on their radar. This is changing. Agri-GDP growth has been volatile and middling (2-4\%) - therefore, it is likely that rising investor interest in the packaged-rice market is not based on current statistics. It is mostly because packaged-rice players earn over 2/3rd of their revenues from branded products - the key driver for valuation besides their distribution network in India and overseas. With static rice production at ~105mmt, dwindling monsoons, and depleting water-table levels, India's 10 mmt rice exports could be affected, leading to sustained PE enquiries and interest in the branded-rice segments.

Global rice production cuts (due to weather and lower yields) could drive prices and therefore rice acreage higher

PUSA 1509 is found to inferior, the higher acreage shift to PUSA 1121 would result some fall in production and push prices higher

Poligy support in terms of price stabilistion fund, encouragement to grow more pulses, $G$ M in other food crops could result in a shift to other crops

Iran accounted for $40 \%$ of India's basmati export, howevera ban by them has seen their share falling to $25 \%$. Any move to uplift this would be a huge positive

Indians greater participation in the world economy to dive export demand for Indian basmat. ME and WestAsia aspiring to shore up food security to sustain interest in India's basmati industry

MAJOR DEALS IN BASMATI RICE MARKET

| Company | Investor | Deal size(\$ mn) | Date | PC Comments |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- |
| LT Foods | Rabo PE | 10 | Nov-09 | In two tranches of US\$ 5mn each |
| Kohinoor Foods | McCormick | 115 | 2011 | Snapped domestic marketing rights |
| Dunar Foods | TVS Capital, IFC | 25 | Mar-12 |  |
| Bamati rice milling firm in Haryana | Ebro Foods (Spanish firm) | 14.5 | Mar-13 | Acquired from Olam International |
| Bush Foods | Hassad Foods | 125 | Apr-13 | Acquired 70\% stake from Standard Chartered PE <br> fund @ EV/EBITDA of 7-8x and PER of 14x |
| Kohinoor Foods | Al Dahra | 19 | Jul-13 | 20\% stake at almost 11.1x EV/EBITDA consider- <br> ation |
| Shrilalmahal | PE held | NA |  |  |
| Best Foods | PE held | NA |  |  |

## USDA lowers rice production forecasts for three large rice exporting countries

For the third time now, the USDA (US Department of Agriculture) has lowered its forecast of global rice production for FY16 (by 1.7 mmt to 474 mmt , down $1 \%$ yoy; first decline since FY10). Thailand, India, and North America (large exporters to the global market) account for most of the expected global rice production decline in FY16. The smaller global crop is due to both reduced area and lower average yield, with adverse weather a main factor. At 159 mn hectares in FY16, global rice area is almost 1 mn hectares below FY15, with Thailand accounting for more than half of the decline. The rice area is also projected to be smaller than a year earlier in Africa and the United States. FY16's season average farm price is projected to be at US\$ 12.8-13.8 per cwt (up from US\$ 11.9 in FY15, up 7.5-16.0\% over last year).

|  | FOLLOWING ADVERSE WEATHER, <br>  <br>  <br>  <br> USDA CUT RICE PRODUCTION ESTIMATES |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Production |  | Revision in production |  |  |
| in mmt | Revised | Earlier | in mmt | $\%$ |
| Thailand | 16 | 18 | 1.60 | -8.9 |
| India | 104 | 104 | 0.50 | -0.5 |
| US | 10 | 10 | 0.10 | -1.0 |
| Others | 345 | 344 | -0.50 | 0.1 |
| Global | 474 | 476 | 1.70 | -0.4 |

India's rice production has been static. However, exports have seen a steady rise


Besides, India's production has been static at $\sim 105 \mathrm{mmt}$ in FY12-16 while its exports of rice (all varieties) has nearly doubled in the same period (exports rose to 13.2 mmt in FY16 from 7.2 mmt in FY12). With firming prices of pulses and other cereals and lower water availability, the acreage under rice is likely to fall. This, along with rising domestic demand could risk exports and push prices higher.

"Procurement cost is low; therefore, lower stock cost and increased exports will help in volume and income growth in H2FY16."

## Basmati rice industry on an uptrend; strong demand growth expected to continue

Demand for basmati rice has seen a CAGR of $20 \%$ in the past five years driven by growth in domestic and exports markets. With the rise in incomes and shift in consumer preference to branded rice, domestic demand is likely to remain strong. In basmati exports, India has taken away a substantial share from Pakistan - its only competitor - due to superior quality and higher production. Industry sources say production of basmati rice has increased in the current kharif season due to higher acreage ( $+5 \%$ ) and sowing of high-yield Pusa 1509 variety (which consumes less time and water; however, it is less preferred). Higher supply and a fall in export demand (especially by crude exporting economies such as Middle East) have pressured basmati prices lately, so much so that the basmati paddy variety, which used to command a significant premium non-basmati paddy, actually traded at a discount for a brief period. However, with firm prices of pulses, cotton, and ample stock of basmati, we see the crop acreage switching from basmati to other competing crops. Lower acreage coupled with rising demand is likely to lead to an increase in realisations over the next $1-2$ years.

[^0]Population of India (bn)


Per capita income at factor cost (US\$)


## A large population ensures high demand for agricultural produce

Population (1.27bn) is a key demand driver of agricultural growth in India, whose consumption expenditure is likely to touch US\$ 3.6tn by 2020 up from an estimated US\$ 0.2 tn in 2015. A large population ensures high demand for agricultural produce.

Domestic demand for packaged food has been on the rise mainly due to rising income and propensity to spend, changing lifestyles, women participating in the workforce, and most important, convenience of shopping (portals and modern retail outlets). Indian basmati demand is also likely to benefit from rising external demand going by India's wider participation in the global economy. India exported agricultural products worth US\$ 40bn in FY15, of which rice formed a major part (US\$ 8bn or $20 \%$ of total). Of the total rice exports, basmati rice accounted for almost $60 \%$ or US $\$ 4.5 \mathrm{bn}$. There is a general surge in demand for agricultural produce from India. Growth in the export of basmati rice is likely to follow a rebound in crude oil price.

## Key risks for India's basmati players

- The Middle East is the biggest export market for Indian basmati rice and accounted for over 83\% of its exports in FY15. Hence, any political turmoil in this region may adversely impact India's exports.
- While most incumbents hedge their forex exposure, a high volatility in foreign currency could adversely impact revenues, margins, and earnings.
- Any high volatility in procurement costs could impact margins. Incumbents are engaged in purchasing both semi-processed rice and paddy depending upon the demand and price expectations. This exposes them to fluctuations in raw-material prices. While a longer inventory-holding period may result in higher realisations (because of ageing), it results in higher carrying and interest costs.
- The Indian government had banned exports of non-basmati rice in April 2008 to curb inflation and subsequently lifted this ban in September 2011. Although there has been no ban on basmati rice exports, any such policy change could significantly impact the industry.


## INDUSTRY PROSPECTS

## Basmati: Undeniably ATTRACTIVE



Rice has always been a staple diet and with an increasing demographic base globally, absolute demand and consumption of rice will only rise each year. Outside India, the Middle East remains a dominant market and lifting of sanctions from Iran will lead to strong volumes. Demand is also picking up in the US, Europe, and Australia as they explore new palates. Changing lifestyles, increasing brand awareness, and higher cultivation that ensures steady supply, are boosting basmati growth.
Demand for basmati rice has seen a CAGR of $15 \%$ in the past five years driven by growth in the domestic
and exports markets. We expect this momentum to continue. With a rise in incomes and a shift in consumer preference to branded rice, we expect domestic demand to remain strong. In basmati exports, India has taken away a substantial share from Pakistan - its only competitor - due to superior quality and higher production. This coupled with low inventory, shift in acreage, and rising demand is likely to lead to either stable or higher realisations over the medium term. With lower stock cost, margins should rise, driving the overall profit growth. Despite being in the B2C segment, due to strong underlying growth and decent return ratios, sector valuations remain attractive.

## BRIEF PROFILES OF LEADING BRANDED BASMATI PLAYERS



It is one of the older rice millers and exporters of basmati rice. They have modern processing units in Karnal, Amristrar, and Delhi and a corporate office in New Delhi. Mr Chaman Lal Setia is the CMD. The company has a milling capacity of $14 \mathrm{mt} /$ hour and its flagship brand is Maharani. In FY15, it earned a revenue/EBITDA/ PAT of Rs. $5.08 \mathrm{bn} / 388 \mathrm{mn} / 195 \mathrm{mn}$ with FY10-15 CAGRs of $32 \% / 31 \% / 34 \%$. The company pays about $10 \%$ of its profit in dividends and is a listed company with a market cap of Rs. 2.5bn, trading at an FY16 PE of 11x.

The company has a portfolio of food products ranging from basmati rice, ready-to-eat products, cooking sauces and pastes, spices, seasonings, and frozen food. It has expanded its product basket to ghee, paneer (Indian cottage cheese), ready mixes, namkeens, sweets, premium biscuits and cookies. It has a milling capacity of $50 \mathrm{mt} /$ hour and its key brands are Kohinoor Authentic, Kohinoor Extra Long, and Kohinoor Silver. In 2011, McCormick, US, snapped up domestic marketing rights of Kohinoor brands and in 2013 Al Dahra LLC of UAE acquired a 20\% stake in the company with a view of long-term food security. It earns revenues of Rs. 12bn, of which Rs. 7 bn are from exports. Its financials have been quite volatile and revenue growth was a sluggish 6\% in FY11-15. The company has not paid any dividend in the past three years. Its market cap is Rs. 1.5bn.

KRBL is India's largest exporter of branded basmati rice and owns the largest rice milling capacities in the country. Its rice brands include India Gate, Train, Al Wisam, Doon and Nurjahan (contributing 95\% of total revenues). Its flagship brand - India Gate - contributes $55-60 \%$ of total revenue while non-basmati rice (mostly private labels) contributes $3 \%$. KRBL derives $40 \%$ of its revenues from exports - 30\% from the Middle East, and $10 \%$ from the rest of the world. It also wishes to penetrate the Chinese and Russian markets in the near future. KRBL has maintained excellent financials vs. peers with revenue/EBITDA/PAT CAGR of $19 \% / 21 \% / 25 \%$ in FY10-15. The company has been steadily increasing its dividend payouts FY15 payout was 14\%. It trades at an FY16 PER of 15x.

This company offers branded basmati rice, value-added staples, and organic food. Its brands Royal and Daawat are \#1 and \#2 in the US and India respectively. While basmati rice remains its core proposition, its vision is to emerge a global specialty food company. In FY15, it earned a revenue/EBITDA/PAT of Rs. 18bn/1.6bn/307mn translating to CAGRs of $22 \% / 20 \% / 17 \%$ in FY1015. The listed company has been consistently paying dividends of $15-17 \%$. Its market cap is Rs. 6.5bn and it trades at an FY16 PER of 8x.

# A BRIEF annual report analysis of the past five years 

## Topline growth has been healthy, but margins have suffered due to MTM losses on inventory

A bottom-up calculation of the four large listed players (Chaman Lal Setia, Kohinoor, KRBL, and LT Foods) shows a topline growth of $18 \%$ in FY11-15; including REI Agro, it is just about $4 \%$. The five large listed players account for Rs. 100bn in revenues - a fourth of the industry's revenues (domestic + exports). Performance was divergent - players such as KRBL (leader in the segment) and LT Foods saw strong topline CAGR of $19 \%$ and $22 \%$ respectively. Kohinoor Foods revenue growth has been rather sluggish at $6 \%$.

Operating profit growth for the industry was relatively slow at 13\% (excluding Rei Agro) perhaps due to franchise expansion and mtm losses on huge paddy/rice inventory. LT Foods's OPM margins slipped to $9 \%$, but KRBL's and Chaman Lal's were steady at $16 \%$ and $8 \%$ respectively.

## Working capital remains a challenge for some players

Working capital needs are high in staples trading/milling companies. Ageing is necessary to ensure higher recovery of head rice, reduce the proportion of broken rice while processing, removing moisture, and increasing the aroma. Both paddy and rice are aged, though there is a limit to the effectiveness of ageing paddy beyond six months. Rice can be aged for longer periods and rice aged beyond a year has a price premium, but remains a niche product. Ageing results in high working capital requirements. Indian banks have generally been liberal in financing these working capital requirements. The financing standards have been very low and credit has been easily available. The result has been that most processors had purchased more paddy than was necessary, which in turn had resulted in high inventory holding periods. However, the data points to a gradual decline (of 24 days) in FY11-15.

|  | INVENTORY HOLDING PERIOD HAS BEEN ON A <br> SLIGHT DECLINE OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Days | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | Average |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 85 | 76 | 64 | 50 | 49 | 64 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 283 | 307 | 299 | 292 | 338 | 304 |
| KRBLLtd | 235 | 274 | 219 | 193 | 208 | 226 |
| LT Foods Ltd | 220 | 194 | 124 | 132 | 133 | 161 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 334 | 316 | 301 | 321 | 349 | 324 |
| Average (incl Rei Agro) | 231 | 233 | 202 | 197 | 215 | 216 |
| Average (excl Rei Agro) | 206 | 213 | 177 | 167 | 182 | 189 |


| THE AVERAGE CASH CONVERSION CYCLE HAS IMPROVED MARGINALLY OVER FIVE YEARS; HOWEVER, IT SLIPPED IN FY15 VS. FY14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Days | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | Average |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 126 | 104 | 89 | 77 | 79 | 95 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 321 | 357 | 331 | 314 | 382 | 341 |
| KRBLLtd | 242 | 285 | 236 | 206 | 223 | 239 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 260 | 250 | 166 | 167 | 160 | 201 |
| Average | 237 | 249 | 206 | 191 | 211 | 219 |

Players now realize that there is minimal benefit in holding excess paddy inventory. The reason is that all 'aged' paddy no matter the vintage (in terms of harvest year) is almost priced the same. Consequently, if paddy is stored for more than a year, then its value is determined by the next year's paddy prices. Players such as Kohinoor Foods and Rei Agro are holding excess inventory and could see significant inventory writeoffs going by the current low prices of basmati paddy prices.

The recovery rate is the amount of rice that can be milled from a given quantity of paddy. Industry producers are consistently recovering 65\% of the paddy for milling. By-product production (husk at $\sim 20 \%$ and bran at $9 \%$ ) is fairly standard across the industry. All processors have access to the latest and improved technologies in processing and storage and therefore there are limited competitive advantages in recovery.

## Balance sheet issues are likely to be crucial

The third continued bad season is likely to put pressure on companies with higher receivable days. A marginal jump in these days suggests a slower secondary offtake than primary sales. As a result, companies are facing pressure from both inventory and receivables. Therefore, sales growth needs to be seen in conjugation with WC deterioration for agri-staples companies. KRBL has a high inventory-holding period, so it has a deteriorating cash-conversion cycle.

## Weaker cash conversion leads to lower dividend payouts

Given relatively lower capex needs (mostly working capital), most companies (Chaman Lal, KRBL, LT Foods) have announced dividends over the last five years. However, weak cash generation has meant lower dividend payouts, even as KRBL's improved to $14 \%$ in FY15 from $6 \%$ in FY11. Most of the players in the space have healthy RoEs of 20-30\%. Among best performers are KRBL and Chaman Lal Setia with ~27\% RoEs. Low capex intensity and healthy EBITDA margin of $15 \%$ enable the sector's RoEs to be high despite higher WC intensity. However, cash conversion is usually closely watched.

## Where do we go from here?

FY16 is likely to be muted for branded basmati players due to a weak demand environment in the domestic market and in exports. On the domestic side, weak monsoons and excess production have put pressure on offtake. Globally, weak weather patterns and low commodity prices have impacted the overall demand. The sharp correction in basmati prices is likely to result in MTM losses on paddy inventory (while incrementally it would be lower in H2FY16). Heightened aggression among local and international players due to a weak season could soften margins. Players with a high brand recall would be able to combat such pressures to a certain extent.

Average cash conversion cycle deteriorated in FY15, led by rise in inventory days

|  | DEBTORS DAYS |  | INVENTORY DAYS | CREDITOR DAYS | AVG CASH CONVERSION CYCLE |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | FY14 | FY15 | FY14 | FY15 | FY14 | FY15 | FY14 | FY15 |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 32 | 34 | 50 | 49 | 4 | 3 | 77 | 79 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 62 | 74 | 292 | 338 | 40 | 30 | 314 | 382 |
| KRBL Ltd | 31 | 35 | 193 | 208 | 18 | 20 | 206 | 223 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 54 | 45 | 132 | 133 | 19 | 18 | 167 | 160 |

Lengthened cash-conversion cycle led to cash flow from operations turning negative

|  | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 43 | $(36)$ | 131 | $(211)$ | 206 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | $(382)$ | $(1,462)$ | 1,292 | $(167)$ | 1,054 |
| KRBL Ltd | $(1,477)$ | 1,410 | 1,701 | $(2,115)$ | 3,241 |
| LT Foods Ltd | $(730)$ | 419 | $(157)$ | 1,633 | $(4)$ |

Despite higher wcap, healthy margins and low capex needs led to consistent dividends

| Dividend payout | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 23.42 | 19.55 | 8.65 | 7.75 | 9.69 | 13.81 |
| KRBLLtd | 6.31 | 10.25 | 12.86 | 10.67 | 14.25 | 10.87 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 16.14 | 0.00 | 15.47 | 15.38 | 17.26 | 12.85 |
| Average (excl Rei Agro \& Kohinoor) | 15.29 | 9.93 | 12.33 | 11.27 | 13.73 | 12.51 |

## RoCEs are healthy at about 17-18\%

|  | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 14.92 | 19.03 | 24.86 | 29.38 | 27.88 | 23.21 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 4.92 | 26.74 | 8.67 | 7.38 | -0.02 | 11.93 |
| KRBLLtd | 15.66 | 10.60 | 17.23 | 20.29 | 17.33 | 16.22 |
| LT Foods Ltd | 7.56 | 8.35 | 11.75 | 11.38 | 11.15 | 10.04 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 13.00 | 12.19 | 11.41 | 7.57 | -92.38 | -9.64 |
| Average (excl Rei Agro \& Kohinoor) | 12.71 | 12.66 | 17.95 | 20.35 | 18.79 | 16.49 |

RoEs are healthy at about $20 \%$

|  | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd. | 18.07 | 20.53 | 26.06 | 30.73 | 26.67 | 24.41 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd. | -5.25 | 76.42 | 1.72 | 5.82 | -22.94 | 11.15 |
| KRBLLtd. | 20.40 | 10.70 | 16.80 | 27.20 | 27.20 | 20.46 |
| LTFoods Ltd. | 10.20 | -0.80 | 21.30 | 24.30 | 18.00 | 14.60 |
| Rei Agro Ltd. | 17.70 | 9.50 | 8.40 | -1.50 | 0.00 | 6.82 |
| Average (excl Rei Agro \& Kohinoor) | 16.22 | 10.14 | 21.39 | 27.41 | 23.96 | 19.82 |

Revenue growth excluding Rei Agro has been 15\%+; Kohinoor posted sluggish growth

| Revenue Rs. mn | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg | CAGR FY11-15\% |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 1,680 | 2,175 | 2,725 | 4,162 | 5,083 | 3,165 | 31.9 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 9,074 | 9,611 | 10,878 | 12,634 | 11,590 | 10,757 | 6.3 |
| KRBL Ltd | 15,446 | 16,310 | 20,803 | 27,913 | 31,130 | 22,321 | 19.1 |
| LT Foods Ltd | 8,229 | 9,842 | 16,597 | 18,026 | 18,216 | 14,182 | 22.0 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 37,244 | 42,255 | 50,891 | 45,232 | 18,558 | 38,836 | -16.0 |
| Total | 71,673 | 80,193 | 101,894 | 107,968 | 84,577 | 89,261 | 4.2 |

Operating profit growth has been strong at about 20\%

| EBITDARs.mn | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg | CAGR FY11-15\% |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 133 | 186 | 245 | 345 | 388 | 259 | 30.8 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 1,119 | 3,600 | 1,165 | 1,202 | 178 | 1,453 | -36.9 |
| KRBL Ltd | 2,322 | 2,354 | 3,247 | 4,652 | 4,910 | 3,497 | 20.6 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 789 | 1,266 | 1,500 | 1,505 | 1,610 | 1,334 | 19.5 |
| Total | 4,362 | 7,406 | 6,156 | 7,704 | 7,086 | 6,543 | 12.9 |

Operating profit margins vary from 8-16\%

| OPM\% | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 7.90 | 8.53 | 8.98 | 8.28 | 7.64 | 8.19 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 12.33 | 37.46 | 10.71 | 9.52 | 1.53 | 13.50 |
| KRBL Ltd | 15.03 | 14.43 | 15.61 | 16.67 | 15.77 | 15.67 |
| LT Foods Ltd | 9.58 | 12.86 | 9.04 | 8.35 | 8.84 | 9.40 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 20.83 | 20.40 | 18.35 | 15.00 | -258.64 | -7.98 |
| Total | 6.09 | 9.23 | 6.04 | 7.14 | 8.38 | 7.33 |

PAT growth has been strong at $22 \%$

| PAT Rs. mn | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg | CAGR FY11-15\% |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 60 | 77 | 120 | 182 | 195 | 127 | 34.1 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | $(235)$ | 1,832 | 97 | 65 | $(726)$ | 207 | 32.6 |
| KRBL Ltd | 1,155 | 711 | 1,505 | 2,653 | 2,809 | 1,767 | 24.9 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 162 | 44 | 338 | 385 | 307 | 247 | 17.3 |
| Total | 1,142 | 2,665 | 2,060 | 3,285 | 2,585 | 2,348 | 22.6 |

D/E is over $1 x$, as high working capital is needed for ageing paddy inventory

| Debt to Equity | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yr avg |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 1.36 | 1.24 | 0.67 | 0.91 | 0.63 | 0.96 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 5.35 | 2.52 | 2.33 | 1.71 | 1.97 | 2.78 |
| KRBL Ltd | 1.49 | 1.40 | 1.09 | 1.35 | 1.07 | 1.28 |
| LT Foods Ltd | 3.43 | 3.67 | 3.69 | 3.03 | 3.20 | 3.40 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 1.63 | 1.92 | 2.04 | 2.16 | -2.10 | 1.13 |


| Debt Rs.mn | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | $5 y \mathrm{ravg}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 474 | 496 | 347 | 611 | 500 | 485 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 9,247 | 8,955 | 8,539 | 8,319 | 8,119 | 8,636 |
| KRBLLtd | 9,021 | 9,381 | 8,703 | 13,795 | 13,510 | 10,882 |
| LT Foods Ltd | 7,251 | 7,924 | 9,008 | 8,357 | 9,606 | 8,429 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 38,530 | 47,993 | 53,312 | 55,836 | 58,123 | 50,759 |
| Total | 64,523 | 74,749 | 79,909 | 86,918 | 89,858 | 79,191 |
| Asset turns have seen some improvement over a five-year period |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Asset turnover | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | 5yravg |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 1.83 | 2.09 | 2.53 | 3.17 | 3.14 | 2.55 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 0.81 | 0.74 | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.73 | 0.78 |
| KRBLLtd | 0.98 | 0.86 | 1.06 | 1.20 | 1.10 | 1.04 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 0.90 | 0.92 | 1.39 | 1.42 | 1.36 | 1.20 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.58 | 0.48 | 0.28 | 0.50 |
| Sector has been re-rated in the past five years - trades at 10x PER (trailing)PER |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | $5 y \mathrm{avg}$ |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 5.15 | 3.29 | 2.38 | 1.68 | 3.43 | 3.18 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 0.00 | 0.49 | 6.60 | 23.44 | 0.00 | 7.63 |
| KRBLLtd | 5.62 | 6.05 | 3.51 | 4.39 | 13.98 | 6.71 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 7.84 | 22.34 | 3.63 | 6.26 | 8.53 | 9.72 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 9.29 | 5.23 | 4.62 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.83 |
| Average (excl Rei Agro) (x) | 4.65 | 8.04 | 4.03 | 8.94 | 8.65 | 6.81 |
| Sector available at $2 \times$ PBR |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PBR | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | $5 y r a v g$ |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 0.89 | 0.63 | 0.55 | 0.46 | 0.84 | 0.67 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 0.78 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0.40 |
| KRBLLtd | 1.07 | 0.64 | 0.66 | 1.14 | 3.12 | 1.33 |
| LT Foods Ltd | 0.60 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.66 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 1.13 | 0.48 | 0.38 | 0.17 | -0.02 | 0.43 |
| Average (excl Rei Agro) (x) | 0.83 | 0.50 | 0.47 | 0.70 | 1.32 | 0.76 |
| Trades at an EV/EBITDA of 8 x |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EV/EBITDA | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | $5 y \mathrm{ravg}$ |
| Chaman Lal Setia Exports Ltd | 4.71 | 3.31 | 2.42 | 2.47 | 2.68 | 3.12 |
| Kohinoor Foods Ltd | 9.37 | 2.70 | 7.77 | 8.12 | 55.80 | 16.75 |
| KRBLLtd | 6.66 | 5.74 | 4.27 | 5.33 | 10.73 | 6.55 |
| LTFoods Ltd | 10.62 | 6.85 | 6.71 | 7.08 | 7.55 | 7.76 |
| Rei Agro Ltd | 7.95 | 6.67 | 6.59 | 8.64 | -1.22 | 5.73 |
| Average(excl Rei Agro)(x) | 7.84 | 4.65 | 5.29 | 5.75 | 6.99 | 8.54 |



We imagine that there is only one Vidarbha. But, in reality there are two. There is the one Vidharbha that we know - the place where farmers are constantly tested by the vagaries of the monsoon, the largely agrarian Vidharbha of oranges, cotton and soyabean. But then there is a second Vidharbh - one that Ground View discovered in its two-day, 13-visit tour across Nagpur (also known as Maharashtra's second capital) and Amravati (divisional headquarter) - this Vidharbha's fortunes do not depend on good crops and vagaries of monsoon. This Vidharbha consists of a rising middle class (like any other region in India), the business community, government employees and other salaried people, the construction segment - you get the picture. This Vidharbha mirrors any other upcoming region in any part of India, where aspirations are rising and premiumisation is evident - probably nothing reflects this better than the presence of major automobile brands (both Indiän and international) in the cities. While long-suffering farmers are delaying even some of their discretionary medical treatments (incidentally affecting hospital revenues), this other Vidharbha is spending on their hopes and desires. GV takes you through the tale of these two cities within one.

## DARK DREARY VIDHARBHA



## Staring at a 50\%+ failed crop, impacting allied businesses

Amravati district (covering 14 talukas) is spread over 1,200 hectares. Of this, the total area under cultivation is 887 hectares (roughly $74 \%$ ). Of the total area under cultivation, only 251 hectares is irrigated ( $28 \%$ ) while the rest is dependent on monsoons. Total open wells in the area are 55,382 . Amravati has majorly black and shal-low-black soil, in which soyabean, cotton, turdal (pigeon peas), sorghum, chana, and oranges are cultivated.
More than $50 \%$ of the land under cultivation has seen a crop failure this year, while around $30 \%$
needs additional rainfall for a good crop output. Soyabean, with the largest area under cultivation, has seen a failed crop with lower and inconsistent rainfall. Yields have fallen so substantially at a few places that they do not even cover the costs of cutting the crop. Tur has also seen below-average yields, thereby impacting earnings. Cotton and chana outputs are contingent on additional rainfall, failing which yields are likely to be lower. Less rainfall has affected Vidarbha's agriculture badly, but checks reveal that its situation is still better off than Marthwada, which has seen a much wider impact on the local economy.


## "Failed soyabean has led to fall in volumes. FCI is not floating tenders impacting our business,"

- a local transporter whose business is transporting agri produce for FCl from Amravati and nearby talukas to Nagpur



## ANALYSING TRACTOR TRACTION IN VIDHARBHA

## Tractors are an immediate casualty, but crop failure is not the only factor

Tractors are usually a direct casualty of lower farm income and the scenario is no different in Vidarbha. Tractor volumes in FY15 were down substantially - FY16 volumes have fallen another $5-10 \%$ from the already significantly lower FY15 volumes. Current tractor population in the region is 10,077 of which $\sim 60 \%$ are less than five years old. Tractor penetration in the region currently is $20 \%$ vs. $5 \%$ a decade ago.

## Evolution of tractor financing in Vidharbha equally at fault

The tractor financing industry is as equally responsible as lower agri-crop for the current bleak condition of the tractor industry in the region. Increasing number of financing companies and easing eligibility norms saw annual tractor sales more than double from FY11 to FY14 (up 130\%) with most of the increase in penetration levels during this period. Number of financers in the region increased from just a handful public sector banks about 7-8 years ago, to the current 15 entities.

In addition to relaxing land requirements, various attractive schemes pushed small and marginal farmers into owning tractors. Schemes such as 'Get Rs. 1 along with 7/12 (7/12 or


Source: Company, PhillipCapital India Research

saat-baara is an extract from the land ownership register maintained by the government of Maharashtra) and own a tractor' were quite prevalent until 2-3 years ago. In addition to financing schemes, dealers also

offered credit periods to farmers for the down payment. All this saw the proportion of overall tractors purchased through financing increase to around $\sim 90 \%$ currently from $\sim 50 \%$ in FY12.

Easy credit availability led to a surge in tractor volumes from FY11 to FY14, creating a huge oversupply in the region. Farmers with very low land holdings, which did not justify owning a tractor, were also acquiring one. Oversupply, coupled with three consecutive crop failures, started hitting the industry hard - volumes began to fall rapidly amid rising competitive pressure.

Now, farmers have started renting out tractors in order to meet their EMI obligations. The last two years have also seen rising tractor repossessions - another deterrent to tractor volume growth. While this was prominent in Madhya Pradesh, it wasn't very prevalent in the Amravati belt. Dealers believe that there is re-possessed stock of $\sim 1,200$ tractors in MP's Gunna area and more than 500 tractors in Surajpur this is significantly higher than the annual volumes in the entire Amravati belt. The dealers of the top two tractor-producing companies said that recovery is still a year away (assuming normal monsoons) and will be fuelled initially by replacement demand.

## Poor scenario and rising competition - the leader loses market share

Sluggish industry and fierce competition means significant changes in the business models for companies operating in the segment, especially the leader, Mahindra \& Mahindra (M\&M), who has a market share of $34 \%$ as of FY15 vs. $47 \%$ in FY12. Increasing competitive intensity and price undercutting by a few of its competitors saw the company losing market share in the region.


Falling market share was a result of significant increase in the competitive intensity - number of tractor companies increased to around 15 currentlyfrom 4-5 five years ago.

| A M R A V ATI DISTRICT : |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Dealers of various companies |  |
| Company | No. of Showrooms |
| M\&M | 1 |
| TAFE | 1 |
| John Deere | 1 |
| New Holland | 2 |
| Eicher | 2 |
| Force | 3 |
| Indo Farm | 1 |
| Preet | 2 |
| Swaraj | 1 |
| Kubota | 3 |
| Captain | 2 |
| Sonalika | 2 |
| Escorts: Farmtrac | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| Escorts: Powertrac | $\mathbf{2 5}$ |
| ACE |  |
| Mitsuibishi | TOTAL |



Source: Company, PhillipCapital India Research

New Holland, which opened its second showroom in Amravati three years ago, managed to sell more than 200 tractors in its first year, primarily taking away M\&M's share - that year, M\&M sold 756 tractors. The industry clocked $52 \%$ growth in overall tractor sales while M\&M managed to report only $40 \%$ growth in volumes, implying market share loss. Rising competitive intensity was also marked by pricing actions by some of the companies to gain a foothold in the market. Sonalika, a known under-cutter, affected the industry with its lower prices. Another important reason M\&M lost market share was that it did not chase volumes at the cost of pricing.

## Sluggish demand, rising competitive intensity made dealers desperate

So bleak is the mood of the tractor industry in the region that dealers are leaving no stone unturned to generate volumes and achieve targets. For example, an employee at one of the dealerships GV visited was actually in the middle of selling a tractor to a person with no $7 / 12$. He was made eligible for financing using some other person's $7 / 12$, just so that the sale could be made. Dealers have started offering credit periods to farmers on the down payment. The numerous such ways (usually underhanded) in which dealers are enticing farmers shows just how dire the condition is and it will be quite some time before demand kicks in, even considering the low base. Most dealers believe that a demand revival is likely only after September 2016, and even that depends largely on the rains.


Few second-hand tractors acquired in the exchange schemes lying in a dealer's yard

## M\&M: Using a different approach to help dealers

Intense competition has forced M\&M dealers to follow certain practices, which were unheard of for the company before FY10. While it is true that offering credit for down payments was done by dealers themselves, M\&M also altered some of its policies to help them out. Correcting dealer inventory is normally the first step (and M\&M did this), but it went a step ahead and allowed a dealer to offer exchange bonus (prevalent practice in four wheelers) on
old tractors to attract volumes. One dealer GV visited had a $2,500 \mathrm{sq} \mathrm{ft}$. yard for parking the old tractors acquired in exchange schemes.

M\&M had made it mandatory for its dealerships to have a workshop/service station (no other companies in the area have this as a criteria) and this has helped dealers service tractors of other companies (with M\&M's consent), thereby sustaining them in the downturn


Tractors of other companies along with M\&M's waiting to be serviced at an M\&M dealer's workshop.

## M\&M's Arjun Novo tractor expected to combat falling volumes, regain market share

An M\&M dealer that GV spoke to seemed confident that with a year of Arjun Novo's launch, he will be able to piggyback on this best-selling tractor's performance and boost his volumes. Dealers said they have seen notable changes in the enquiries for this product, primarily driven by word-of-mouth publicity. M\&M's regional office and its dealers are upbeat - they believe Arjun Novo will help M\&M to improve market share. While this will not change their fortunes completely, it will help sustain in increasing competitive intensity.

The Amravati dealer GV visited was excited about Arjun Nuvo's competitive edge (design and performance) over other tractors in this category. Arjun Novo is believed to not only carry the maximum load in its segment, but is also seen as having one of the best cultivating speeds. A quick check revealed that this tractor potentially halves cultivation time - this would translate into substantialsavings in fuel costs for owners. While this
is just one of the factors, the dealer also pointed out noticeable changes in comfort and handling for farmers. Farmers also talked about better seating comfort, more powerful engine, and smoother gearbox vis-à-vis peers. A look at the dealership brochure reveals a strong marketing pitch pushing the superiority of the product.

Arjun Novo: Capability of carrying a maximum load up to 2200 kgs

## Demand from infrastructure: Glimmer of hope, but will not turn the tide



Increasing infrastructure activity provides a glimmer of hope for the tractor volumes in the region. With work on various infrastructure projects (Nagpur Metro, Pardi flyover, Pardi Grid Metro, cementing of the 45 km . stretch of the inner ring road, outer ring road) gaining traction, demand for tractors for construction activities has improved. While tractor registration for commercial use accounts foronly $5-10 \%$ of overall tractor sales in the region, diversion of tractors to commercial use helps reduce oversupplyin the agriculture segment.

Monthly report card of the regional office of a financing company covering 15 branches and 12 districts

It is visible from columns 3, 4, and 5 that tractor volumes have seen considerable sluggishness. H1FY16 performanceis significantly below the targets set for FY16, but October 2015 has seen some sort of a revival with the financing for around 100 tractors each for M\&M and Swaraj. While the branch head did not expect October 2015 performance to continue for the rest of the year, he was optimistic vs. H1FY16 performance. He said that most of the increase in volumes in October 2015 was from the infrastructure segment

## 2-WHEELER INDUSTRY: THE TALE OF TWO ECONOMIES

## Rising aspirations driving premiumisation

While the agri-dependent segment has had a big impact on demand driven by lower yields and tapering MSP growth, the aspiration of the salaried class and business community has driven premiumisation, visible from GV's interactions with various two-wheeler and three-wheeler dealers. The volumes of companies with more rural-centric products (Hero Motocorp and M\&M) were adversely affected, while players with a more urban touch and premium products (Bajaj Auto, Maruti, Hyundai) saw contrary trends.

Interactions with two-wheeler dealers in Nagpur and Amravati highlighted the stark differences in consumer behav-iour- dealers in the Amravati belt (more rural) talked about dwindling sales, increasing offers, and rising inventory while Nagpur dealers (urban-centric) boasted of high-end products, low inventory, and no discounts.

## Amravati: Price sensitive market given tough economic conditions

Three consecutive failed or low-yielding crops have plagued the Amravati market, which saw stiff competition, increasing offers, and higher inventory. Despite these, overall motorcycle volumes for the industry in the region are down by $15-20 \%$. Low cost of ownership was the most important factor driving volumes. Bajaj Auto


Various offers on Honda motorcycles, which have seen the most sluggishness


Series of motorcycles displayed at Hero Motocorp showroom
was successful in this aspect, with competing dealers highlighting market share gains for CT100 and Platina, given their predatory pricing and good fuel economy. On the other hand, Hero and Honda dealers saw strong inventory build-up and various financing and insurance offers to boost volumes.

These showrooms not only saw more offers (to boost volumes) but also a surge in inventories (given weaker festive season sales). Hero Motocorp and Honda dealers were saddled with 2-3 months of motorcycle inventories. Negative growth in retail sales and inventory push by companies in anticipation of festive demand left dealers with bloating inventories.

On the other hand, Bajaj dealers said there was no inventory push and that they did not give any discounts to push volumes.



Pulsar RS 200 displayed at a Nagpur dealer's showroom

## Nagpur: Strong brand pull especially towards the premium segment

In complete contrast to Amravati, the Nagpur market is seeing rising aspiration and higher brand awareness. Dealers reported increased traction in products in the Rs. 100,000-350,000 range - this segment continues to be the fastest growing in this region - which fares well for companies such as Bajaj Auto and Eicher Motors whose strong product portfolio caters to this price band. With government employees comprising a large chunk of this addressable market, dealers keenly await the implementation of the Seventh Pay Commission, which will increase the disposable income in the hands of the government employees, thereby driving more volume growth.
One Bajaj Auto dealer shared his sales mix - in which the higher aspirations are visible. Around

$75 \%$ of this dealer's volumes are from the premium segment dominated by Pulsar and aided by Avenger and KTM.

Stronger brand awareness and lower exposure to the low-end segment ensured that this dealer was better off than his peers - his retail sales drop was restricted to $5 \%$ vs. the more than $10 \%$ drop for his peers in the festive season. While overall retail sales were negative, largely due to falling volumes of the Discover family, Pulsar continued to see strong traction with new product launches.

While the Pulsar segment continues to drive major volumes, the dealer expects the newly launched Avenger series to gain traction. The confidence stems from not only the quality of the product, but also from the great response to a rally that the dealer organised throughout the city to display the newly launched Avenger. The dealer expects to more than double his Avenger volumes with a strong response to the newly launched Avenger series (both 220cc and 150cc segments). Channel checks suggest that Bajaj Auto is targeting sales of over 25,000 units/month of Avenger by March 2016 compared to 35004500 units/month from the older version.


## Scooters: Continue to defy the market slowdown



"We continue to have a 15-20 days waiting in Activa. Activa accounts for 60\% of our overall volumes."

- Honda dealer.

Scooters is the only segment that continued to defy the agri-slowdown impact and saw strong traction at both Vidharbha and Nagpur. This trend is prevalent across the country - reflected in the rising share of scooters in overall twowheeler volumes.

Showroom visits highlighted that dealers did not need to put in any special efforts to drive volumes nor did they have to offer any schemes or discounts to get volumes - this was across various scooter brands. Honda continued to get the strongest response for its best-selling Activa. Despite increased supply in the festive season, Activa had a waiting period of 15-20 days.

While Honda continued to be the highest-selling scooter brand in the region, TVS Jupiter was a strong second, with a good feedback (even from competing dealers). The TVS Motors' dealer sounded very upbeat on the product quality and expected volumes from Jupiter. He was more positive on TVS' ability to accept dealer suggestions and translate these into making the end product better.

# "Activa sells the best; however, we get strong competition from Jupiter. It is also doing well." 

- A Honda dealer in Amravati.
"TVS has accepted our recommendations and came up with Jupiter. Now you see the volume it does. Jupiter sales will slowly jump from around 45,000 units per month to touch 60,000 units/month and will eventually touch a 100,000 units."
- A TVS Motors' dealer

Not only were Honda and TVS dealers rejoicing their respective scooters' success, but even the Hero dealership was equally excited about the company's new launches - dealers believe these new products will help them partially negate the impact of slowing motorcycle volumes. The newly launched Maestro Edge accounted for around $10 \%$ of monthly sales volumes for the Hero dealer in less than a month of its launch. The new Duet is yet to be launched in the region.
"We have already sold 52 units of the new Maestro Edge since launch. We expect further pick up in volumes during Diwali (this was less than one month after the product's launch)."

- A Hero dealer.



## NO SIGNS OF SLOWDOWN IN PVS, NEW LAUNCHES FUEL GROWTH



## Demand holding strong; supply constraints limiting growth

While the two-wheeler segment remained sluggish, passenger vehicles saw a diametrically opposite trend in the Vidharbha region, with growth holding up to a large extent. OEMs with a higher exposure to agri-related consumers saw some amount of demand slowdown - M\&M dealers saw sales declining as agri-dependent customers delayed purchases.M\&M even saw negative retail sales in Dussera and Diwali (only its TUV 300 continued to have a waiting period due to supply constraint). However, the higher salaried class and the busi-ness-dependent middle- to upper-class consumers continued to splurge on discretionary spends. Maruti and Hyundai dealers reported positive trends, with strong retail growth in the festive
season. New product launches and a series of product refreshes, especially from Maruti, fuelled the growth (which was limited by supply constraints for certain models, without which overall growth could have been $>10-15 \%$, a trend not seen across the region). Consumer preferences reflected rising aspirations and upgrades, with most of this growth driven by premium hatchbacks and entry-level sedans. A visit to the Nexa showroom was a further surprise - the $1,500 \mathrm{sq} . \mathrm{ft}$. dealership was totally jam-packed on a weekday for bookings of the newly launched Baleno!.

In the region, the premiumisation trends in four-wheelers are similar to two-wheelers. All major luxury brands (JLR, BMW, Audi, Mercedes) have a presence in the region, hoping to grab a piece of the rising business class.

## Maruti - still going strong

In a region where most dealers were despairing, Maruti dealers were happy. Discussions with one such dealer in Nagpur (he is among the top-10 Marutidealers in India with over six showrooms in Maharashtra) revealed that his dealership registered good growth in the festive season. The most surprising takeaway was that even Dzire and Swift (petrol versions) have a waiting period of 15-30 days. Strong demand was also apparent from reduced discounts, even during the festive season. The Rs. 5,000 rise in discounts in Q2FY16 was rolled back fully during the festive season.

Also surprising was that Renault KWID did not have a major impact on Alto sales. While initially KWID saw strong bookings ( 2,000 since its launch in Nag-


Maruti showroom had customers even at 8PM most othershad already downed their shutters

> "KWID had strong eyeballs with bookings, but it has not impacted our volumes for Alto. Delivery is an issue and we have seen customers cancelling their KWID bookings and buying Alto."

- a Maruti dealer.
pur) and impacted bookings for competing cars such as Alto and Hyundai's Eon, its very high waiting period turned the tide again in favour of the incumbent. Additionally, some issues with the car's pick up also lent some negative publicity in the region.

Maruti's new AMT and hybrid variant launches also helped gain strong customer traction. Like in urban areas, AMT versions are preferred in semi-urban/rural regions of Vidharbha. Celerio AMT had a month-long waiting period, largely driven by supply constraints. While the response for AMT versions has been very encouraging, the response for the hybrid versions of CIAZ and Ertiga was also strong. More than $30 \%$ of total CIAZs sold by the dealer in Nagpur are

hybrid versions - enquiries suggest that this ratio could improve further, the dealer said. This is despite there being no discounts for the CIAZ hybrid, as against discounts offered on old CIAZ models (for the last 3-4 months).

The dealer expects to see this strong momentum in volumes to continue even after the festive season, largely driven by exchange schemes (which will help boost December volumes) and because of the impact of the Seventh Pay Commission (majorly for entry level and hatch segments). The dealer expects this growth despite some cannibalisation of Swift volumes due to the recently launched Baleno.

## Nexa: Adding to overall strong momentum

Nexa's big 1,500 sq. ft. showroom was a beehive of activity at 2PM- all sales executives were so busy that customers waited to be attended to - such is the strong momentum created by Baleno for Maruti volumes.

This Nexa showroom in Nagpur is the only one catering to the entire Vidarbha region. With more than 80 bookings in just two days of launching, Baleno's current waiting is more than three months (monthly allotment ranges from 30-40 units). Baleno has cannibalised some volumes of Swift and has had an impact on Hyundai's 120 .

While Baleno has been stealing the show at Nexa, it has also helped increase enquiries for S-Cross, which was losing its launch momentum. Few customers walk-
ing in to see Baleno were also seen enquiring about S-Cross-however, the conversion rate was pretty low on this. S-Cross volumes have come down to around 40 units/month currentlyfrom 60-65 around its launch time. Nexa employees seem very enthused about Baleno and are also keenly awaiting the XA Alpha launch (third product in the Nexa stable).


Hyundai - good demand, supply a constraint
Hyundai dealers were equally upbeat about volume momentum, with Hyundai 120 stealing the show. Creta was an added bonanza for dealers with both Creta and 120 having strong waiting periods - Creta has a waiting of $3-4$ months while it is about a month for 120 (Elite and Active). Supply constraints, especially in 120 , was

a major reason for the strong waiting period. While the waiting period in 120 does not reflect the Baleno impact, the dealer saw a good drop in enquiries and conversion rates after Baleno's launch.

Unlike Alto, KWID had some impact on Hyundai EON's volumes - Hyundai increased discounts to Rs. 25,000 per vehicle from Rs. 15,000 earlier in a bid to lure buyers and offset the impact of KWID. Like Maruti, Hyundai also expects the volume momentum to continue, driven by higher exchange offers in December 2015.

M\&M: Agri bites, SUV sales have been sluggish
M\&M volumes were impacted by the economic slow down and weak agri incomes - a trend that is divergent from Maruti and Hyundai. Retail sales in the festive season were down 5-10\% yoy. TUV 300 was the only bright spot with all other models struggling to boost sales. With more than 170 bookings since launch, the car has a waiting of around 1-3 months. The waiting is specifically more for the AMT version, a trend seen with Maruti as well. TUV 300 has seen some cannibalization of Bolero sales in the region to an extent of $15-20 \%$. This saw discounts inching up for Bolero by Rs. 10,000- to around Rs. 30,000.

A surprising thing that the dealer highlighted was that M\&M has implemented a rule restricting dealers from providing additional discounts (above the company's mentioned levels) - M\&M fines dealerships for violating this rule (dealers said the fines are as high as Rs. 500,000 ).


Tata Motors - some respite after 2-3 years of slowdown
Tata's ageing portfolio (with no major product launches until this year) have seen volumes come down by $60 \%$ over the past two years. Current monthly volumes stand at 100 units per month against 250 units per month a couple of years ago. However, with the launch of Zest, Bolt and Nano AMT this year, the fortunes seem to be turning for Tata Motors' dealership. Retail volumes in the region are up by around $10 \%$, with a month's waiting for Nano AMT. The dealership is keenly awaiting the launch of Kite hatch and sedan, which is expected to be aggressively priced. This will further boost volumes at the dealership.


## Exchange schemes gaining traction,to partly offset December lull

Exchange schemes have been gaining traction over the past few years after various auto OEMs such as Maruti, Hyundai, and M\&M, started their used-cars businesses, which complement their existing business. This can be seen from the jump in total volumes sold via the exchange schemes. As seen from the chart, total volumes sold by Maruti via exchange schemes has gained traction, with over $30 \%$ of total volumes sold coming from exchange schemes. This has jumped from $17 \%$ in FY11. The proportion of sales through exchange offers will continue the upward trajectory over the next few years, as car penetration increases and buyers look at upgrading their existing vehicles.

As the volumes from the used-car business gains traction, discounts on various cars have partly turned into exchange bonuses. This was evident from all four-wheeler dealer visits, where most of the displayed offers were for exchange schemes.

Exchange offers have been incrementally used by various companies to boost their volumes in December, which is typically a sluggish month. This also helps them clear year-end inventories. Dealers across Maruti, Hyundai, and M\&M were upbeat about December sales, primarily driven by exchange offers. These offers will be used to replace cash discounts.

\% mom growth in December


The chart shows the percentage mom growth trend for Maruti and Hyundai for December. This clearly shows improving sequential sales trends in December largely boosted by exchange schemes.

## Indian Economy - Trend Indicators

## Monthly Economic Indicators

| Growth Rates (\%) | Sep-14 | Oct-14 | Nov-14 | Dec-14 | Jan-15 | Feb-15 | Mar-15 | Apr-15 | May-15 | Jun-15 | Jul-15 | Aug-15 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | Sep-15 (

## Quarterly Economic Indicators

| Balance of Payment ${ }^{\text {(USD } \text { Bn) }}$ | Q1FY14 | Q2FY14 | Q3FY14 | Q4FY14 | Q1FY15 | 02FY15 | 03FY15 | Q4FY15 | Q1FY16 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Exports | 73.9 | 81.2 | 79.8 | 83.7 | 81.7 | 85.3 | 79.0 | 70.8 | 68.0 |
| Imports | 124.4 | 114.5 | 112.9 | 114.3 | 116.3 | 123.9 | 118.3 | 102.5 | 102.2 |
| Trade deficit | -50.5 | -33.3 | -33.2 | -30.7 | -34.6 | -38.6 | -39.3 | -31.7 | -34.2 |
| Net Invisibles | 28.7 | 28.1 | 29.1 | 29.3 | 26.7 | 28.5 | 30.9 | 30.2 | 28.0 |
| CAD | -21.8 | -5.2 | -4.1 | -1.3 | -7.9 | -10.1 | -8.4 | -1.5 | -6.2 |
| CAD (\% of GDP) | 4.6 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| Capital Account | 20.6 | -4.8 | 23.8 | 9.2 | 19.2 | 16.5 | 23.6 | 30.7 | 18.1 |
| BoP | -0.3 | -10.4 | 19.1 | 7.1 | 11.2 | 6.9 | 13.2 | 30.1 | 11.4 |


| GDP and its Components ${ }^{(\text {Yor, \%) }}$ | Q1FY14 | Q2FY14 | Q3FY14 | Q4FY14 | 01FY15 | Q2FY15 | Q3FY15 | Q4FY15 | 01FY16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Agriculture | 2.7 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 2.6 | 2.1 | -1.1 | -1.4 | 1.9 |
| Industry | 5.9 | 4.2 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 8.1 | 7.2 | 3.8 | 7.2 | 6.4 |
| Mining and Quarrying | 0.8 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 11.5 | 4.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 4.0 |
| Manufacturing | 7.2 | 3.8 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 8.4 | 7.9 | 3.6 | 8.4 | 7.2 |
| Electricity, gas and water supply | 2.8 | 6.5 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 10.1 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 4.2 | 3.2 |
| Services | 8.9 | 9.7 | 8.3 | 5.6 | 8.4 | 10.2 | 11.1 | 8.0 | 8.6 |
| Construction | 1.5 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 6.5 | 8.7 | 3.1 | 1.4 | 6.9 |
| Trade, hotels, Transport, \& Communication | 10.3 | 11.9 | 12.4 | 9.9 | 12.1 | 8.9 | 7.4 | 14.1 | 12.8 |
| Financing, Insurance, Real Estate\& business services | 7.7 | 11.9 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 9.3 | 13.5 | 13.3 | 10.2 | 8.9 |
| Public administration, defence, \& other services | 14.4 | 6.9 | 9.1 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 7.1 | 19.7 | 0.1 | 2.7 |
| GVA at Basic Price | 7.2 | 7.5 | 6.6 | 5.3 | 7.4 | 8.4 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 7.1 |

Annual Economic Indicators and Forecasts

| Indicators | Units | FY8 | FY9 | FY10 | FY11 | FY12 | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16E | FY17E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Real GDP growth | \% | 9.3 | 6.7 | 8.6 | 8.9 | 6.7 | 4.5 | 4.7 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 8.0 |
| Agriculture | \% | 5.8 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 8.6 | 5.0 | 1.4 | 4.7 | 0.2 | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| Industry | \% | 9.2 | 4.1 | 10.2 | 8.3 | 6.7 | 0.9 | -0.1 | 6.6 | 7.0 | 7.5 |
| Services | \% | 10.3 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 9.2 | 7.1 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 9.4 | 8.9 | 9.4 |
| Real GDP | Rs Bn | 38966 | 41587 | 45161 | 49185 | 52475 | 54821 | 91698 | 98271 | 105543 | 113986 |
| Real GDP | US\$ Bn | 967 | 908 | 953 | 1079 | 1096 | 1008 | 1517 | 1611 | 1624 | 1809 |
| Nominal GDP | Rs Bn | 49864 | 56301 | 64778 | 77841 | 90097 | 101133 | 113451 | 126538 | 139479 | 159079 |
| Nominal GDP | US\$ Bn | 1237 | 1229 | 1367 | 1707 | 1881 | 1859 | 1876 | 2074 | 2146 | 2525 |
| Population | Mn | 1138 | 1154 | 1170 | 1186 | 1202 | 1219 | 1236 | 1254 | 1271 | 1302 |
| Per Capita Income | US\$ | 1087 | 1065 | 1168 | 1439 | 1565 | 1525 | 1518 | 1655 | 1688 | 1940 |
| WPI (Average) | \% | 4.7 | 8.1 | 3.8 | 9.6 | 8.7 | 7.4 | 6.0 | 2.0 | -1.0 | 5.6 |
| CPI (Average) |  | 6.4 | 9.0 | 12.4 | 10.4 | 8.3 | 10.2 | 9.5 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Money Supply | \% | 22.1 | 20.5 | 19.2 | 16.2 | 15.8 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 13.0 |
| CRR | \% | 7.50 | 5.00 | 5.75 | 6.00 | 4.75 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Repo rate | \% | 7.75 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 6.75 | 8.50 | 7.50 | 8.00 | 7.50 | 7.0 | 7.00 |
| Reverse repo rate | \% | 6.00 | 3.50 | 3.50 | 5.75 | 7.50 | 6.50 | 7.00 | 6.50 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| Bank Deposit growth | \% | 22.4 | 19.9 | 17.2 | 15.9 | 13.5 | 14.4 | 14.6 | 11.4 | 12.0 | 13.5 |
| Bank Credit growth | \% | 22.3 | 17.5 | 16.9 | 21.5 | 17.0 | 15.0 | 14.3 | 9.5 | 10.0 | 12.0 |
| Centre Fiscal Deficit | Rs Bn | 1437 | 3370 | 4140 | 3736 | 5160 | 5209 | 5245 | 5126 | 16181 | 5568 |
| Centre Fiscal Deficit | \% of GDP | 2.9 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 4.8 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.5 |
| Gross Central Govt Borrowings | Rs Bn | 1681 | 2730 | 4510 | 4370 | 5098 | 5580 | 5641 | 5920 | 6349 | 6313 |
| Net Central Govt Borrowings | Rs Bn | 1318 | 2336 | 3984 | 3254 | 4362 | 4674 | 4536 | 4469 | 4603 | 4566 |
| State Fiscal Deficit | \% of GDP | 1.5 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| Consolidated Fiscal Deficit | \% of GDP | 4.4 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 6.9 | 7.6 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 5.0 |
| Exports | US\$ Bn | 166.2 | 189.0 | 182.4 | 251.1 | 309.8 | 306.6 | 318.6 | 316.7 | 298.0 | 311.4 |
| Yor Growth | \% | 28.9 | 13.7 | -3.5 | 37.6 | 23.4 | -1.0 | 3.9 | -0.6 | -5.9 | 4.5 |
| Imports | US\$ Bn | 257.6 | 308.5 | 300.6 | 381.1 | 499.5 | 502.2 | 466.2 | 460.9 | 443.0 | 469.6 |
| Yoy Growth | \% | 35.1 | 19.7 | -2.5 | 26.7 | 31.1 | 0.5 | -7.2 | -1.1 | -3.9 | 6.0 |
| Trade Balance | US\$ Bn | -91.5 | -119.5 | -118.2 | -129.9 | -189.8 | -195.6 | -147.6 | -144.2 | -145.0 | -158.2 |
| Net Invisibles | US\$ Bn | 75.7 | 91.6 | 80.0 | 84.6 | 111.604 | 107.5 | 115.2 | 116.2 | 118.8 | 123.5 |
| Current Account Deficit | US\$ Bn | -15.7 | -27.9 | -38.2 | -45.3 | -78.2 | -88.2 | -32.4 | -27.9 | -26.2 | -34.6 |
| CAD (\% of GDP) | \% | -1.3 | -2.3 | -2.8 | -2.6 | -4.2 | -4.7 | -1.7 | -1.4 | -1.2 | -1.4 |
| Capital Account Balance | US\$ Bn | 106.6 | 7.8 | 51.6 | 62.0 | 67.8 | 89.3 | 48.8 | 90.0 | 65.5 | 75.5 |
| Dollar-Rupee (Average) |  | 40.3 | 45.8 | 47.4 | 45.6 | 47.9 | 54.4 | 60.5 | 61.2 | 65.0 | 60.0 |

[^1]| Name of company | Sector | $\frac{\mathrm{CMP}}{\mathrm{Rs}}$ | Mkt CapRs mn | Net Sales (Rs mn) |  | EBIDTA (Rs mn) |  | PAT(Rs mn) |  | EPS (Rs) |  | EPS Growth (\%) |  | P/E (x) |  | P/B ( x ) |  | EV/EBITDA ( x ) |  | ROE (\%) |  | ROCE (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E |
| Bajaj Auto | Automobiles | 2,576 | 745,294 | 230,020 | 267,416 | 48,248 | 56,526 | 36,576 | 41,720 | 126 | 144 | 16.0 | 14.1 | 20.4 | 17.9 | 5.8 | 4.9 | 14.9 | 12.3 | 28.7 | 27.5 | 26.1 | 25.7 |
| Bharat Forge | Automobiles | 902 | 209,957 | 89,056 | 102,437 | 17,160 | 19,996 | 9,827 | 11,630 | 42 | 50 | 36.9 | 18.3 | 21.4 | 18.1 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 13.4 | 11.5 | 23.3 | 22.7 | 18.7 | 21.5 |
| Hero MotoCorp | Automobiles | 2,621 | 523,291 | 283,370 | 325,211 | 41,714 | 48,473 | 30,162 | 34,800 | 151 | 174 | 18.7 | 15.4 | 17.3 | 15.0 | 6.6 | 5.5 | 12.5 | 10.6 | 37.9 | 36.5 | 37.4 | 36.4 |
| Ashok Leyland | Automobiles | 93 | 263,813 | 175,338 | 212,276 | 19,077 | 23,825 | 8,908 | 12,605 | 3 | 4 | 280.9 | 41.5 | 29.6 | 20.9 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 14.4 | 11.0 | 15.3 | 18.2 | 12.7 | 15.8 |
| Tata Motors | Automobiles | 385 | 1,249,055 | 2,601,404 | 2,788,829 | 385,326 | 460,176 | 117,811 | 159,103 | 37 | 49 | $-16.3$ | 35.1 | 10.5 | 7.8 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 17.2 | 18.8 | 8.1 | 9.5 |
| Mahindra \& Mahindra | Automobiles | 1,245 | 773,446 | 389,990 | 443,171 | 46,607 | 55,378 | 34,604 | 41,758 | 59 | 71 | 15.9 | 20.7 | 21.3 | 17.6 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 16.7 | 14.0 | 16.0 | 17.0 | 13.9 | 15.3 |
| Mahindra CIE | Automobiles | 246 | 79,358 | 62,117 | 70,080 | 7,685 | 9,580 | 3,414 | 4,988 | 11 | 15 | 43.1 | 46.1 | 23.2 | 15.9 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 11.8 | 9.0 | 15.2 | 18.7 | 10.9 | 15.1 |
| Apollo Tyres | Automobiles | 190 | 96,842 | 131,888 | 149,178 | 20,245 | 23,496 | 10,857 | 13,013 | 21 | 26 | 7.6 | 19.9 | 8.9 | 7.4 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 18.1 | 18.5 | 15.4 | 15.9 |
| Maruti Suzuki | Automobiles | 4,385 | 1,324,666 | 565,951 | 677,653 | 96,353 | 113,046 | 57,789 | 70,480 | 191 | 233 | 55.7 | 22.0 | 22.9 | 18.8 | 4.6 | 3.8 | 13.3 | 10.8 | 20.2 | 20.4 | 20.6 | 21.0 |
| ACC | Cement | 1,394 | 261,670 | 126,698 | 146,510 | 16,153 | 21,858 | 10,385 | 13,933 | 55 | 74 | -10.6 | 34.2 | 25.2 | 18.8 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 15.7 | 11.6 | 12.1 | 15.3 | 10.2 | 12.9 |
| Ambuja Cement | Cement | 209 | 323,803 | 231,195 | 268,414 | 34,634 | 47,120 | 16,536 | 21,857 | 8 | 11 | -13.4 | 32.2 | 25.0 | 18.9 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 8.7 | 6.3 | 8.8 | 11.1 | 12.9 | 12.5 |
| India Cement | Cement | 79 | 24,359 | 58,814 | 65,319 | 8,224 | 9,926 | 966 | 2,430 | 3 | 8 | n.a. | 151.7 | 25.2 | 10.0 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 6.4 | 4.8 | 2.7 | 6.0 | 4.6 | 6.4 |
| Mangalam Cement | Cement | 236 | 6,292 | 8,461 | 9,655 | 513 | 1,075 | -187 | 220 | -7 | 8 | n.a. | n.a. | -33.6 | 28.6 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 23.0 | 10.4 | -3.7 | 4.2 | 0.9 | 4.6 |
| Shree Cement | Cement | 12,738 | 443,764 | 60,803 | 88,591 | 14,340 | 25,234 | 5,323 | 11,146 | 204 | 320 | 66.5 | 57.1 | 62.5 | 39.8 | 7.7 | 6.7 | 30.2 | 16.7 | 12.4 | 16.7 | 11.8 | 17.1 |
| JK Cement | Cement | 644 | 44,994 | 37,856 | 45,428 | 5,495 | 7,805 | 1,324 | 2,744 | 19 | 39 | 6.1 | 107.3 | 34.0 | 16.4 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 13.0 | 9.0 | 7.7 | 14.3 | 5.7 | 8.1 |
| Dalmia Bharat Ltd | Cement | 711 | 57,742 | 66,010 | 81,682 | 13,579 | 20,119 | 954 | 4,161 | 12 | 51 | 940.7 | 336.0 | 60.5 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 8.9 | 5.7 | 2.1 | 8.4 | 4.9 | 7.6 |
| OCLIndia | Cement | 503 | 28,601 | 25,121 | 29,245 | 4,144 | 5,573 | 1,878 | 3,025 | 33 | 53 | 38.2 | 61.0 | 15.2 | 9.5 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 7.0 | 4.7 | 13.5 | 18.7 | 11.1 | 16.5 |
| JK Lakshmi Cement | Cement | 374 | 44,003 | 27,011 | 34,300 | 5,266 | 7,079 | 1,905 | 3,244 | 16 | 28 | 5.7 | 70.3 | 23.1 | 13.6 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 11.7 | 8.2 | 12.2 | 18.1 | 8.4 | 11.5 |
| HeidelbergCement | Cement | 77 | 17,483 | 18,816 | 20,352 | 2,543 | 3,252 | 684 | 1,257 | 3 | 6 | n.a. | 83.7 | 25.5 | 13.9 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 10.1 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 11.8 | 5.6 | 7.8 |
| Ultratech Cement | Cement | 2,845 | 780,743 | 294,839 | 352,072 | 55,910 | 73,168 | 28,834 | 40,677 | 105 | 148 | 37.4 | 41.1 | 27.1 | 19.2 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 15.3 | 11.1 | 13.4 | 16.2 | 10.1 | 12.9 |
| ABB India | Capital Goods | 1,265 | 268,043 | 79,105 | 84,530 | 6,819 | 8,306 | 3,795 | 4,602 | 18 | 22 | 66.1 | 21.3 | 70.6 | 58.2 | 8.8 | 8.1 | 39.4 | 32.3 | 12.5 | 13.9 | 12.1 | 13.2 |
| BHEL | Capital Goods | 218 | 532,475 | 271,342 | 315,627 | 8,075 | 38,855 | 7,595 | 25,380 | 3 | 10 | -46.9 | 234.2 | 70.1 | 21.0 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 48.5 | 10.5 | 2.2 | 6.9 | 1.7 | 5.6 |
| Alstom T\&D | Capital Goods | 525 | 134,399 | 44,305 | 51,431 | 4,241 | 6,267 | 2,130 | 3,620 | 8 | 14 | 76.8 | 70.0 | 63.1 | 37.1 | 9.4 | 8.3 | 31.9 | 21.3 | 14.9 | 22.3 | 15.5 | 22.3 |
| Crompton Greaves | Capital Goods | 183 | 114,883 | 131,691 | 144,955 | 6,203 | 12,015 | 2,194 | 5,776 | 4 | 9 | 19.2 | 163.3 | 52.4 | 19.9 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 21.5 | 11.2 | 5.5 | 13.1 | 4.5 | 9.1 |
| Engineers India | Capital Goods | 202 | 67,994 | 17,235 | 18,548 | 1,938 | 3,183 | 2,910 | 3,904 | 9 | 12 | -11.9 | 34.2 | 23.4 | 17.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 21.6 | 12.6 | 10.5 | 13.1 | 10.8 | 13.6 |
| KEC International | Capital Goods | 143 | 36,661 | 90,852 | 104,389 | 6,970 | 8,527 | 1,546 | 2,423 | 6 | 9 | 119.2 | 56.7 | 23.7 | 15.1 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 8.2 | 6.7 | 10.6 | 14.6 | 9.9 | 10.8 |

PhillipCapital India Coverage Universe: Valuation Summary

| Name of company | Sector | $\begin{array}{r} \text { CMP } \\ \hline \text { Rs } \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Mkt Cap } \\ \hline \text { Rs mn } \end{array}$ | Net Sales (Rs mn) |  | EBIDTA (Rs mn) |  | PAT (Rs mn) |  | EPS (Rs) |  | EPS Growth (\%) |  | P/E (x) |  | P/B (x) |  | EV/EBITDA (x) |  | ROE (\%) |  | ROCE (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E |
| Alstom India | Capital Goods | 632 | 42,488 | 23,419 | 28,472 | 1,687 | 2,385 | 1,569 | 2,134 | 23 | 32 | 12.5 | 36.0 | 27.1 | 19.9 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 20.1 | 13.5 | 14.4 | 17.3 | 15.3 | 18.5 |
| Larsen \& Toubro | Capital Goods | 1,508 | 1,403,857 | 1,037,731 | 1,259,213 | 123,953 | 168,246 | 45,676 | 72,208 | 49 | 77 | 3.4 | 58.1 | 30.9 | 19.5 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 18.2 | 13.5 | 10.4 | 14.6 | 4.8 | 6.5 |
| Siemens | Capital Goods | 1,387 | 493,796 | 103,975 | 113,400 | 7,350 | 8,987 | 5,559 | 7,961 | 16 | 22 | 56.6 | 43.2 | 88.8 | 62.0 | 10.6 | 9.7 | 63.9 | 51.2 | 11.9 | 15.7 | 9.6 | 12.8 |
| Cummins India | Capital Goods | 1,062 | 294,497 | 50,080 | 60,405 | 8,546 | 10,948 | 7,854 | 9,719 | 28 | 35 | 28.6 | 23.8 | 37.5 | 30.3 | 9.2 | 8.3 | 34.4 | 26.7 | 24.6 | 27.3 | 21.7 | 24.1 |
| VA Tech Wabag | Capital Goods | 647 | 35,253 | 28,059 | 33,315 | 2,328 | 2,943 | 1,265 | 1,655 | 23 | 30 | 13.2 | 30.8 | 27.8 | 21.2 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 15.2 | 12.2 | 12.7 | 14.7 | 10.8 | 12.3 |
| Thermax | Capital Goods | 877 | 104,506 | 56,147 | 60,313 | 5,122 | 5,159 | 2,763 | 3,279 | 23 | 28 | 39.9 | 18.7 | 37.8 | 31.9 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 20.5 | 20.0 | 11.7 | 12.7 | 11.2 | 11.9 |
| Voltas | Capital Goods | 295 | 97,743 | 53,810 | 61,877 | 4,040 | 5,369 | 3,281 | 4,364 | 10 | 13 | -1.4 | 33.0 | 29.8 | 22.4 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 24.6 | 18.4 | 14.0 | 16.4 | 11.8 | 13.9 |
| Coal India | Power | 333 | 2,105,876 | 778,233 | 892,325 | 168,777 | 211,180 | 146,811 | 171,791 | 23 | 27 | 7.0 | 17.0 | 14.3 | 12.3 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 9.2 | 7.0 | 31.7 | 32.2 | 33.5 | 34.2 |
| NTPC | Power | 133 | 1,095,410 | 777,730 | 838,834 | 169,155 | 192,050 | 88,482 | 95,766 | 11 | 12 | -0.3 | 8.2 | 12.4 | 11.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 11.4 | 10.7 | 10.2 | 10.5 | 6.2 | 6.0 |
| Power Grid | Power | 136 | 710,188 | 206,378 | 247,701 | 181,234 | 218,786 | 62,460 | 73,249 | 12 | 14 | 24.3 | 17.3 | 11.4 | 9.7 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 9.7 | 8.5 | 15.4 | 16.0 | 6.1 | 6.5 |
| PTC India | Power | 66 | 19,566 | 136,521 | 168,447 | 10,828 | 13,166 | 3,228 | 3,758 | 11 | 13 | -9.3 | 16.4 | 6.0 | 5.2 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 7.9 | 8.1 |
| Inox Wind | Power | 390 | 86,448 | 46,134 | 57,390 | 8,391 | 10,822 | 6,016 | 7,284 | 27 | 33 | 127.1 | 21.1 | 14.4 | 11.9 | 4.7 | 3.6 | 10.9 | 8.4 | 32.5 | 30.2 | 26.0 | 25.8 |
| Chambal Fertilisers | Agri Inputs | 60 | 24,762 | 108,394 | 108,409 | 8,288 | 8,476 | 3,594 | 3,697 | 9 | 9 | 35.9 | 2.9 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 6.7 | 6.4 | 14.3 | 13.3 | 6.7 | 6.8 |
| Coromandel Fertiliser | Agri Inputs | 194 | 56,613 | 112,382 | 121,927 | 9,246 | 11,408 | 4,980 | 6,521 | 17 | 22 | 22.9 | 30.9 | 11.4 | 8.7 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 7.1 | 5.3 | 16.7 | 19.2 | 17.2 | 19.8 |
| Tata Chemicals Ltd | Agri Inputs | 421 | 107,265 | 185,584 | 190,064 | 24,173 | 25,159 | 8,904 | 9,593 | 35 | 38 | 11.3 | 7.7 | 12.0 | 11.2 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 6.2 | 5.6 | 14.6 | 14.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 |
| Kaveri Seeds | Agri Inputs | 517 | 35,729 | 9,577 | 11,809 | 2,251 | 2,952 | 2,156 | 3,014 | 31 | 44 | -28.4 | 39.8 | 16.5 | 11.8 | 3.9 | 3.1 | 14.9 | 10.9 | 23.6 | 26.5 | 25.1 | 28.5 |
| PI Industries | Agri Inputs | 681 | 93,036 | 22,849 | 27,361 | 4,477 | 5,355 | 2,871 | 3,637 | 21 | 27 | 16.7 | 26.7 | 32.4 | 25.6 | 8.2 | 6.5 | 20.5 | 16.7 | 25.3 | 25.3 | 26.1 | 26.0 |
| Rallis India | Agri Inputs | 207 | 40,168 | 20,423 | 23,016 | 3,001 | 3,636 | 1,668 | 2,088 | 9 | 11 | 6.1 | 25.2 | 24.1 | 19.2 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 13.8 | 11.2 | 18.2 | 19.8 | 16.6 | 18.7 |
| United Phosphorus | Agri Inputs | 448 | 192,036 | 133,799 | 147,892 | 26,276 | 28,452 | 13,809 | 15,011 | 32 | 35 | 17.1 | 8.7 | 13.9 | 12.8 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 8.1 | 6.9 | 21.8 | 21.0 | 17.7 | 17.0 |
| Zuari Agrochemicals | Agri Inputs | 160 | 6,731 | 56,596 | n.a. | 3,060 | n.a. | 730 | n.a. | 17 | n.a. | 370.6 | n.a. | 9.2 |  | 0.8 |  | 9.3 |  | 8.5 | - | 7.5 |  |
| Deepak Fertilisers | Agri Inputs | 144 | 12,724 | 33,995 | n.a. | 5,176 | n.a. | 2,610 | n.a. | 30 | n.a. | 13.0 | n.a. | 4.9 |  | 0.7 |  | 3.3 |  | 15.2 | - | 11.6 |  |
| Monsanto India | Agri Inputs | 2,434 | 42,021 | 6,046 | 7,487 | 1,330 | 1,623 | 1,199 | 1,474 | 69 | 85 | 12.3 | 23.0 | 35.1 | 28.5 | 11.1 | 11.6 | 31.0 | 25.3 | 31.8 | 40.6 | 24.6 | 28.0 |
| Andhra Bank | Financials | 66 | 43,183 | 49,573 | 55,968 | 33,634 | 37,297 | 9,208 | 12,407 | 14 | 19 | 31.4 | 34.7 | 4.8 | 3.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 9.2 | 11.2 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Bank of Baroda | Financials | 172 | 396,431 | 144,325 | 164,453 | 108,508 | 125,258 | 42,847 | 56,738 | 19 | 25 | 26.1 | 30.9 | 8.9 | 6.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 10.3 | 11.9 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| Bank of India | Financials | 137 | 108,571 | 126,964 | 146,510 | 87,478 | 101,814 | 20,151 | 31,557 | 12 | 27 | -53.5 | 127.2 | 11.5 | 5.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 7.1 | 10.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| Canara Bank | Financials | 292 | 158,309 | 107,311 | 138,654 | 80,092 | 102,497 | 29,994 | 45,155 | 51 | 73 | -9.8 | 42.8 | 5.7 | 4.0 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 10.2 | 14.0 | 0.5 | 1.0 |

PhillipCapital India Coverage Universe: Valuation Summary

| Name of company | Sector | $\begin{array}{r} \text { CMP } \\ \hline \text { Rs } \end{array}$ | Mkt Cap <br> Rs mn | Net Sales (Rs mn) |  | EBIDTA (Rs mn) |  | PAT(Rs mn) |  | EPS(RS) |  | EPS Growt (\%) |  | P/E (x) |  | $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}(\mathrm{x})$ |  | EV/EBITDA ( x ) |  | ROE (\%) |  | ROCE (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | F16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17e | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | F177E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | 17 E |
| Corporation bank | Financils | 44 | 44,098 | 46,373 | 55,993 | 34,976 | 42,505 | 10,776 | 15,844 | 12 | 22 | 30.4 | 81.2 | 3.7 | 2.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 13.6 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| HDFC Bank | Financials | 1,102 | 2,73,790 | 264,087 | 314,568 | 212,048 | 252,451 | 120,821 | 145,211 | 48 | 58 | 18.3 | 20.2 | 22.9 | 19.0 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 13.1 | 11.0 | 18.2 | 19.0 | 1.9 | 2.9 |
| ${ }_{\text {IICII Bank }}$ | Financials | 285 | 1,657,286 | 215,970 | 248,403 | 226,725 | 253,443 | 123,255 | 140,435 | 22 | 25 | 12.1 | 16.1 | 13.2 | 11.4 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 7.3 | 6.5 | 14.5 | 14.9 | 1.8 | 2.7 |
| 10B | Financials | 35 | 43,546 | 73,446 | n.a. | 48,072 | n.a. | 11,896 | n.a. | 8 |  | 72.2 |  | 4.2 |  | 0.5 |  | 0.9 |  | 7.1 |  | 0.3 |  |
| Oriental Bank | Financials | 138 | 41,304 | 54,736 | 62,811 | 43,469 | 48,686 | 9,776 | 16,586 | 33 | 55 | 96.7 | 69.7 | 4.2 | 2.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 7.1 | 10.9 | 0.4 | 0.9 |
| PNB | Financials | 134 | 263,613 | 177,394 | 204,470 | 124,506 | 138,211 | 36,739 | 48,306 | 20 | 26 | 20.0 | 31.5 | 6.8 | 5.2 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 9.4 | 11.3 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| SBI | Financials | 251 | 1,950,398 | 799,767 | 910,406 | 486,649 | 519,916 | 187,534 | 220,997 | 26 | 35 | 20.6 | 35.2 | 9.8 | 7.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 10.6 | 11.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
| Union Bank | Financials | 164 | 113,015 | 94,970 | 107,929 | 60,822 | 67,751 | 23,55 | 33,616 | 37 | 53 | 32.2 | 42.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 12.2 | 15.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| Indian Bank | Financials | 133 | 63,975 | 48,014 | 56,438 | 33,385 | 38,546 | 11,319 | 15,260 | 25 | 32 | 17.1 | 29.3 | 5.4 | 4.2 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 8.6 | 10.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 |
| DCB Bank | Financials | 90 | 25,553 | 6,249 | 7,787 | 3,634 | 4,570 | 2,094 | 2,693 | 7 | 10 | 9.5 | 28.6 | 12.1 | 9.4 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 7.0 | 5.6 | 12.8 | 14.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| AxIS Bank | Financials | 521 | 1,238,982 | 163,255 | 192,698 | 159,084 | 181,827 | 85,465 | 99,622 | 36 | 41 | 15.0 | 15.4 | 14.6 | 12.6 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 7.8 | 6.8 | 17.7 | 17.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Indusind Bank | Financials | 958 | 567,307 | 42,485 | 53,394 | 39,631 | 48,893 | 22,94 | 27,426 | 38 | 47 | 12.3 | 24.1 | 25.2 | 20.3 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 14.3 | 11.6 | 16.1 | 14.9 | 1.8 | 3.0 |
| HoFC | NBFC | 1,313 | 2,071,019 | 311,386 | 353,656 | 100,235 | 114,400 | 69,114 | 79,030 | 32 | 38 | 17.4 |  | 40.7 | 34.4 | 5.9 | 5.2 | 20.7 | 18.1 | 21.0 | 21.1 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Shriram Transport Finance | NBFC | 945 | 214,438 | 48,513 | 56,136 | 35,543 | 41,756 | 13,693 | 17,149 | 60 | 76 | 10.6 | 25.2 | 15.7 | 12.5 | 94.5 | 94.5 | 6.0 | 5.1 | 14.0 | 15.4 | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| SKS Micorininace | NBEC | 411 | 52,045 | 12,314 | 19,127 | 3,469 | 5,699 | 2,440 | 4,119 | 19 | 33 | 30.5 | 68.8 | 21.2 | 12.6 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 15.0 | 9.1 | 20.9 | 27.6 | 4.0 | 4.2 |
| LCCHousing Finance | NBEC | 489 | 246,831 | 124,490 | 147,147 | 25,186 | 29,807 | 16,280 | 19,248 | 32 | 38 | 17.4 | 18.2 | 15.2 | 12.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 9.8 | 8.3 | 19.2 | 19.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| Cholamandalam Inves | NBEC | 602 | 93,959 | 20,449 | 24,415 | 12,049 | 14,975 | 5,304 | 7,337 | 34 | 47 | 12.5 | 38.3 | 17.6 | 12.8 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 7.8 | 6.3 | 15.6 | 18.5 | 2.0 | 2.4 |
| Mah \& Mah Finan | NBFC | 232 | 132,096 | 34,011 | 37,698 | 22,548 | 25,016 | 8,491 | 10,616 | 15 | 19 | 2.1 | 25.0 | 15.4 | 12.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 14.2 | 15.9 | 2.4 | 2.7 |
| Shriam City Union Fin | NBFC | 1,863 | 122,823 | 23,595 | 28,070 | 15,493 | 18,486 | 7,095 | 8,660 | 108 | 131 | 27.1 | 22.1 | 17.3 | 14.2 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 7.9 | 6.6 | 16.3 | 17.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| Hindustan Uniever | fMCG | 809 | 1,749,704 | 323,169 | 360,887 | 67,438 | 76,155 | 43,943 | 49,716 | 20 | 23 | 14.0 | 13.1 | 39.9 | 35.3 | 46.0 | 44.1 | 25.5 | 22.5 | 115.2 | 125.1 | 116.9 | 127.9 |
| Marico Industries | fMCG | 389 | 250,680 | 63,524 | 71,981 | 10,220 | 11,694 | 6,698 | 7,709 | 10 | 12 | 16.8 | 15.1 | 37.4 | 32.5 | 11.2 | 9.1 | 24.3 | 20.9 | 29.9 | 28.0 | 27.9 | 27.0 |
| Jubilant Foodworks | fMCG | 1,506 | 98,963 | 24,765 | 30,512 | 2,982 | 4,057 | 1,245 | 1,785 | 19 | 27 | 1.0 | 43.4 | 79.2 | 55.2 | 12.4 | 10.1 | 33.3 | 24.3 | 15.6 | 18.3 | 16.3 | 19.5 |
| Godrej Consumer | FMCG | 1,286 | 437,993 | 92,733 | 106,130 | 17,029 | 19,235 | 11,709 | 13,278 | 34 | 39 | 28.7 | 13.4 | 37.4 | 33.0 | 8.5 | 7.1 | 26.2 | 22.6 | 22.6 | 21.6 | 17.4 | 17.8 |
| ITC | fMCG | 357 | 2,861,446 | 386,541 | 425,303 | 142,239 | 157,863 | 97,143 | 108,674 | 12 | 14 | 5.8 | 11.9 | 29.3 | 26.2 | 8.2 | 7.1 | 19.5 | 17.4 | 27.9 | 27.2 | 23.7 | 23.8 |
| Nestle | fMCG | 6,316 | 608,991 | 81,236 | 99,957 | 16,018 | 21,369 | 10,410 | 12,236 | 108 | 127 | -12.2 | 17.5 | 58.5 | 49.8 | 25.0 | 23.9 | 37.6 | 28.0 | 42.8 | 48.0 | 39.5 | 49.1 |
| Colgate | fMCG | 934 | 253,912 | 42,813 | 49,624 | 9,731 | 11,934 | 6,253 | 7,659 | 46 |  | 106.7 | 22.5 | 20.3 | 16.6 | 15.1 | 13.6 | 25.9 | 20.9 | 74.2 | 81.8 | 77.5 | 86.1 |

PhillipCapital India Coverage Universe: Valuation Summary

| Name of company | Sector | $\frac{\mathrm{CMP}}{\mathrm{Rs}}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Mkt Cap } \\ \hline \text { Rs mn } \end{array}$ | Net Sales (Rs mn) |  | EBIDTA (Rs mn) |  | PAT (Rs mn) |  | EPS (Rs) |  | EPS Growth (\%) |  | P/E (x) |  | P/B ( x ) |  | EV/EBITDA (x) |  | ROE (\%) |  | ROCE (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E |
| Glaxo Smithkline Cons | FMCG | 6,016 | 252,985 | 45,365 | 52,030 | 6,359 | 5,161 | 6,558 | 6,558 | 156 | 156 | 10.1 | -0.0 | 38.6 | 38.6 | 10.7 | 9.8 | 36.2 | 43.4 | 27.8 | 25.5 | 28.8 | 26.5 |
| Agro Tech Foods | FMCG | 583 | 14,207 | 7,871 | 8,314 | 688 | 830 | 379 | 461 | 16 | 19 | 1.3 | 21.9 | 37.5 | 30.8 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 20.8 | 16.8 | 10.9 | 11.9 | 10.6 | 11.7 |
| Asian Paints | FMCG | 818 | 784,336 | 158,237 | 190,330 | 28,120 | 35,717 | 17,753 | 22,383 | 19 | 23 | 28.1 | 26.1 | 44.2 | 35.0 | 13.4 | 11.3 | 27.2 | 21.3 | 30.4 | 32.2 | 31.6 | 33.6 |
| Emami | FMCG | 1,079 | 244,932 | 28,216 | 34,697 | 8,172 | 10,341 | 5,969 | 7,585 | 26 | 33 | 33.9 | 27.1 | 41.0 | 32.3 | 16.3 | 13.3 | 30.7 | 23.8 | 39.8 | 41.3 | 33.8 | 30.5 |
| Britannia | FMCG | 3,203 | 384,331 | 88,418 | 102,237 | 11,765 | 14,333 | 8,409 | 10,274 | 70 | 86 | 55.0 | 22.2 | 45.7 | 37.4 | 21.4 | 15.6 | 32.6 | 26.2 | 46.8 | 41.7 | 50.1 | 44.9 |
| Bajaj Corp | FMCG | 423 | 62,385 | 9,385 | 11,089 | 2,810 | 3,294 | 2,579 | 2,951 | 17 | 20 | 15.3 | 14.4 | 24.2 | 21.1 | 11.5 | 10.2 | 21.5 | 18.0 | 47.7 | 48.2 | 40.5 | 48.0 |
| Apcotex Industries | FMCG | 259 | 5,363 | 4,823 | 5,918 | 647 | 875 | 378 | 515 | 36 | 49 | 53.5 | 36.2 | 7.1 | 5.2 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 7.9 | 5.6 | 29.2 | 30.8 | 28.0 | 30.0 |
| Dabur | FMCG | 267 | 468,544 | 88,380 | 101,967 | 17,042 | 20,291 | 13,731 | 16,058 | 8 | 9 | 28.8 | 16.9 | 34.1 | 29.2 | 11.3 | 9.3 | 27.3 | 22.6 | 33.1 | 31.9 | 30.5 | 30.1 |
| NCC | Infrastructure | 80 | 44,197 | 82,975 | 87,126 | 7,260 | 8,059 | 2,625 | 3,518 | 5 | 6 | 134.8 | 34.0 | 16.8 | 12.6 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 8.7 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 9.2 | 10.2 | 10.8 |
| Ashoka Buildcon | Infrastructure | 164 | 30,683 | 27,842 | 34,685 | 8,368 | 11,270 | 1,187 | 1,693 | 6 | 9 | 23.5 | 42.7 | 25.9 | 18.1 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 8.1 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 8.0 | 4.8 | 6.6 |
| GMR Infrastructure | Infrastructure | 13 | 69,905 | 82,858 | 81,594 | 30,672 | 26,976 | -27,502 | -29,342 | -5 | -5 | -12.8 | 6.7 | $-2.6$ | -2.5 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 16.3 | 18.0 | -41.9 | -80.9 | 0.2 | -0.8 |
| GVK Power | Infrastructure | 8 | 12,318 | 29,885 | 48,605 | 18,897 | 28,264 | -6,809 | -3,136 | -4 | -2 | 33.8 | -53.9 | -1.8 | -3.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 12.8 | 8.4 | -45.7 | -21.7 | 1.2 | 3.4 |
| IRB Infrastructure | Infrastructure | 244 | 85,877 | 51,647 | 55,985 | 28,586 | 31,805 | 5,031 | 6,425 | 14 | 18 | -7.3 | 27.7 | 17.1 | 13.4 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 7.9 | 7.6 | 9.7 | 10.4 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| KNR Construction | Infrastructure | 600 | 16,878 | 10,076 | 12,594 | 1,511 | 1,889 | 1,160 | 1,124 | 41 | 40 | 58.9 | -3.1 | 14.5 | 15.0 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 11.3 | 9.1 | 18.5 | 15.3 | 17.4 | 14.6 |
| J Kumar Infraprojects | Infrastructure | 780 | 25,133 | 17,058 | 22,176 | 3,156 | 4,103 | 1,339 | 1,928 | 42 | 60 | 41.9 | 44.0 | 18.8 | 13.0 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 9.3 | 7.2 | 15.8 | 19.6 | 12.9 | 15.3 |
| Adani Ports \& SEZ | Infrastructure | 316 | 655,146 | 70,310 | 86,162 | 47,201 | 58,344 | 26,419 | 36,357 | 13 | 18 | 14.0 | 37.6 | 24.8 | 18.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 17.5 | 14.0 | 20.1 | 22.0 | 12.0 | 13.7 |
| HCLTechnologies | ITServices | 864 | 1,214,428 | 435,467 | 503,792 | 98,727 | 117,813 | 77,603 | 93,539 | 55 | 66 | 6.9 | 20.7 | 15.7 | 13.0 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 12.3 | 10.3 | 26.9 | 27.0 | 27.3 | 28.3 |
| Infosys | ITServices | 1,152 | 2,646,425 | 611,631 | 695,923 | 167,754 | 198,009 | 133,050 | 156,204 | 58 | 68 | 7.9 | 17.4 | 19.8 | 16.9 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 13.7 | 11.3 | 23.9 | 24.7 | 24.1 | 26.3 |
| TCS | ITServices | 2,537 | 4,998,089 | 1,078,809 | 1,248,401 | 301,218 | 330,985 | 240,133 | 271,170 | 123 | 138 | 22.2 | 12.9 | 20.7 | 18.3 | 7.5 | 6.2 | 16.4 | 14.8 | 36.3 | 33.7 | 38.5 | 35.5 |
| Persistent Systems | ITServices | 669 | 53,548 | 21,728 | 24,845 | 4,348 | 4,997 | 3,124 | 3,646 | 39 | 46 | 7.5 | 16.7 | 17.1 | 14.7 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 11.9 | 10.2 | 19.0 | 19.0 | 18.2 | 18.5 |
| KPIT Technologies | IT Senvices | 138 | 27,148 | 32,149 | 35,749 | 3,050 | 4,370 | 1,895 | 2,775 | 10 | 15 | -20.0 | 46.4 | 13.7 | 9.3 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 9.3 | 6.5 | 12.8 | 16.0 | 11.0 | 14.3 |
| Wipro | ITServices | 569 | 1,405,524 | 520,990 | 576,884 | 110,660 | 117,652 | 90,211 | 98,751 | 37 | 40 | 4.5 | 9.5 | 15.5 | 14.2 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 11.9 | 11.0 | 20.2 | 19.3 | 20.0 | 19.6 |
| Tech Mahindra | ITServices | 543 | 522,259 | 272,238 | 322,112 | 43,994 | 56,779 | 29,027 | 37,010 | 30 | 38 | 19.0 | 27.5 | 18.0 | 14.1 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 11.3 | 8.5 | 18.5 | 19.8 | 19.0 | 20.7 |
| Mindtree Ltd | ITServices | 1,516 | 127,057 | 43,955 | 51,068 | 8,239 | 10,025 | 5,981 | 7,301 | 71 | 87 | 11.3 | 22.1 | 21.2 | 17.4 | 5.2 | 4.2 | 14.9 | 11.7 | 24.5 | 24.3 | 26.4 | 26.4 |
| NIITTechnologies | ITServices | 553 | 33,820 | 27,314 | 30,378 | 4,570 | 4,967 | 2,645 | 2,988 | 44 | 49 | 132.1 | 13.0 | 12.7 | 11.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 7.2 | 6.3 | 17.0 | 16.8 | 17.1 | 16.3 |
| Zee Entertainment | Media | 425 | 408,143 | 56,763 | 66,309 | 14,740 | 19,196 | 9,293 | 12,199 | 10 | 13 | -4.9 | 31.3 | 43.9 | 33.4 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 26.7 | 20.2 | 17.2 | 20.3 | 19.5 | 22.1 |

PhillipCapital India Coverage Universe: Valuation Summary

| Name of company | Sector | $\begin{array}{r} \text { CMP } \\ \text { Rs } \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Mkt Cap } \\ \hline \text { Rs mn } \end{array}$ | Net Sales (Rs mn) |  | EBIDTA (Rs mn) |  | PAT (Rs mn) |  | EPS (Rs) |  | EPS Growth (\%) |  | P/E ( x ) |  | $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}(\mathrm{x})$ |  | EV/EBITDA ( x ) |  | ROE (\%) |  | ROCE (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E |
| HTMedia | Media | 91 | 21,064 | 24,775 | 27,423 | 3,318 | 3,820 | 2,262 | 2,626 | 10 | 11 | 25.8 | 16.1 | 9.3 | 8.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 6.4 | 4.8 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 11.0 | 11.4 |
| Jagran Prakashan | Media | 144 | 46,945 | 20,844 | 22,253 | 5,761 | 6,307 | 2,812 | 3,211 | 9 | 10 | 22.4 | 14.2 | 16.2 | 14.2 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 8.5 | 7.3 | 17.7 | 17.7 | 15.3 | 14.0 |
| Hathway Cable | Media | 43 | 35,462 | 27,804 | 40,401 | 6,124 | 10,900 | 1,270 | 5,270 | 8 | 34 | 58.4 | 315.1 | 5.1 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 7.4 | 3.9 | 8.8 | 28.4 | 5.8 | 17.3 |
| Den Networks | Media | 116 | 20,644 | 23,573 | 34,431 | 6,203 | 11,872 | 1,353 | 4,775 | 9 | 33 | 4.0 | 253.0 | 12.5 | 3.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 6.6 | 19.8 | 8.6 | 19.0 |
| Dish TV | Media | 110 | 116,757 | 31,773 | 36,769 | 10,074 | 12,179 | 2,572 | 4,275 | 2 | 4 |  | 66.2 | 45.4 | 27.3 | -223.4 | 31.1 | 12.5 | 10.1 | -492.5 | 113.9 | 59.1 | 60.9 |
| HMVL | Media | 275 | 20,176 | 9,112 | 10,147 | 2,190 | 2,628 | 1,684 | 2,070 | 23 | 28 | 19.7 | 23.0 | 12.0 | 9.7 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 8.9 | 6.7 | 18.8 | 18.9 | 21.3 | 21.4 |
| DB Corp Limited | Media | 321 | 58,994 | 21,141 | 23,841 | 6,217 | 7,330 | 3,524 | 4,507 | 19 | 25 | 11.4 | 27.9 | 16.7 | 13.1 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 9.3 | 7.6 | 24.2 | 27.0 | 21.4 | 24.4 |
| Eros International | Media | 354 | 33,044 | 18,247 | 20,035 | 4,447 | 5,265 | 3,190 | 3,694 | 34 | 40 | 29.1 | 15.8 | 10.3 | 8.9 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 8.1 | 6.8 | 17.8 | 17.3 | 13.9 | 14.0 |
| Hindalco Inds | Metals | 85 | 176,350 | 1,060,066 | 1,104,039 | 97,201 | 114,585 | 10,857 | 23,009 | 5 | 11 | -61.1 | 111.9 | 16.2 | 7.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 7.5 | 6.1 | 2.8 | 5.6 | 3.7 | 4.7 |
| NALCO | Metals | 40 | 103,090 | 64,366 | 66,746 | 7,534 | 7,864 | 6,467 | 6,831 | 3 | 3 | -68.6 | 5.6 | 15.9 | 15.1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 4.7 |
| Hindustan Zinc | Metals | 157 | 664,643 | 155,976 | 164,820 | 73,243 | 81,729 | 76,770 | 85,038 | 18 | 20 | -6.2 | 10.8 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 4.2 | 3.1 | 15.8 | 15.6 | 15.4 | 15.2 |
| Tata Steel | Metals | 250 | 242,464 | 1,282,941 | 1,298,247 | 83,582 | 119,723 | 14,344 | 12,626 | 15 | 13 |  | -12.0 | 16.9 | 19.2 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 11.8 | 8.1 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 2.8 | 3.0 |
| JSW Steel | Metals | 909 | 219,677 | 476,143 | 548,441 | 95,714 | 113,239 | 21,707 | 31,951 | 90 | 132 | 17.7 | 47.2 | 10.1 | 6.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 6.1 | 4.9 | 9.0 | 11.8 | 6.3 | 7.6 |
| Jindal Steel \& Power | Metals | 75 | 68,847 | 205,664 | 230,731 | 41,477 | 51,159 | -18,148 | -10,757 | -20 | -12 | -386.5 | -40.7 | -3.8 | -6.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 11.5 | 9.0 | -8.6 | -5.4 | 3.2 | 1.3 |
| SAlL | Metals | 56 | 232,937 | 384,033 | 414,077 | -15,671 | -11,329 | $-26,859$ | -30,538 | -7 | -7 | -223.2 | 13.7 | -8.7 | -7.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | -34.9 | -52.5 | -6.6 | -8.1 | -1.8 | -1.9 |
| Sesa Sterlite | Metals | 105 | 310,848 | 751,388 | 854,934 | 214,326 | 234,972 | 66,334 | 88,469 | 18 | 24 | -18.4 | 33.4 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 5.0 | 4.3 | 9.5 | 11.6 | 7.5 | 8.6 |
| ONGC | Oil \& Gas | 256 | 2,194,055 | 1,575,249 | 1,847,063 | 630,097 | 712,597 | 277,127 | 333,773 | 32 | 39 | 22.3 | 20.4 | 7.9 | 6.6 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 13.6 | 14.6 | 11.7 | 12.8 |
| Petronet LNG | Oil \& Gas | 196 | 146,963 | 287,804 | 368,036 | 15,937 | 18,782 | 8,186 | 10,417 | 11 | 14 | -7.2 | 27.2 | 18.0 | 14.1 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 10.7 | 8.8 | 13.1 | 14.9 | 9.8 | 11.1 |
| Cairn India | Oil \& Gas | 158 | 296,508 | 123,092 | 124,761 | 64,940 | 63,382 | 38,974 | 34,062 | 21 | 18 | -36.9 | -12.6 | 7.6 | 8.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 6.5 | 5.7 | 5.9 | 5.1 |
| GAIL | Oil \& Gas | 329 | 417,393 | 583,930 | 634,989 | 57,593 | 70,621 | 34,491 | 43,749 | 27 | 34 | 8.7 | 26.8 | 12.1 | 9.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 8.6 | 6.4 | 11.0 | 12.9 | 7.8 | 9.3 |
| Indraprastha Gas | Oil \& Gas | 493 | 69,069 | 43,984 | 48,003 | 8,780 | 9,519 | 4,690 | 5,180 | 34 | 37 | 7.4 | 10.4 | 14.7 | 13.3 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 7.5 | 6.9 | 21.0 | 21.7 | 15.7 | 16.3 |
| Gujarat State Petronet | Oil \& Gas | 128 | 71,908 | 12,888 | 13,563 | 11,501 | 12,093 | 5,746 | 5,973 | 10 | 11 | 24.0 | 3.9 | 12.5 | 12.0 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 6.4 | 5.6 | 13.8 | 12.9 | 11.4 | 10.8 |
| Oil India | Oil \& Gas | 417 | 250,764 | 119,237 | 127,243 | 58,603 | 63,358 | 37,321 | 40,308 | 62 | 67 | 39.0 | 8.0 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 15.2 | 14.9 | 11.1 | 11.2 |
| Berger Paints | Other | 221 | 153,051 | 54,368 | n.a. | 6,498 | n.a. | 3,868 | n.a. | 11 | n.a. | 22.0 | n.a. | 19.8 |  | 4.7 |  | 24.1 |  | 23.7 | - | 20.8 | - |
| Bharti Airtel | Telecom | 352 | 1,407,884 | 976,664 | 1,093,493 | 336,030 | 391,396 | 54,294 | 81,753 | 14 | 20 | -10.1 | 50.6 | 25.9 | 17.2 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 7.5 | 6.1 | 7.8 | 10.2 | 5.7 | 6.8 |
| Reliance Comm | Telecom | 79 | 196,380 | 234,448 | n.a. | 82,810 | n.a. | 14,143 | n.a. | 7 | n.a. | 47.7 | n.a. | 11.5 |  | 0.6 |  | 6.0 |  | 4.8 | - | 4.2 | - |

PhillipCapital India Coverage Universe: Valuation Summary

| Name of company | Sector | $\frac{\text { CMP }}{\text { Rs }}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Mkt Cap } \\ \text { Rs mn } \end{array}$ | Net Sales (Rs mn) |  | EBIDTA (Rs mn) |  | PAT (Rs mn) |  | EPS (Rs) |  | EPS Growth (\%) |  | P/E (x) |  | $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}(\mathrm{x})$ |  | EV/EBITDA ( x ) |  | ROE (\%) |  | ROCE (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E | FY16E | FY17E |
| Bharti Infratel | Telecom | 380 | 720,639 | 80,099 | 87,244 | 56,483 | 63,555 | 23,155 | 27,390 | 12 | 15 | 16.3 | 18.3 | 31.0 | 26.2 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 12.8 | 11.3 | 14.1 | 17.3 | 10.7 | 12.3 |
| Idea Cellular | Telecom | 142 | 509,525 | 362,321 | 412,443 | 132,303 | 158,472 | 36,195 | 30,556 | 10 | 8 | 13.4 | -15.6 | 14.1 | 16.7 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 7.1 | 5.6 | 13.6 | 10.4 | 7.9 | 7.3 |
| Tata Communication | Telecom | 427 | 121,738 | 210,225 | 223,566 | 33,948 | 37,007 | 1,600 | 2,857 | 6 | 10 | 50.3 | 78.5 | 76.1 | 42.6 | 20.5 | 17.5 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 26.9 | 41.0 | 4.8 | 5.9 |
| Aurobindo Pharma | Pharma | 833 | 486,296 | 146,065 | 161,473 | 33,887 | 39,399 | 20,877 | 24,714 | 36 | 42 | 27.1 | 18.4 | 23.2 | 19.6 | 6.7 | 5.1 | 15.7 | 13.1 | 28.9 | 25.9 | 25.4 | 26.9 |
| Biocon | Pharma | 446 | 89,160 | 33,866 | 39,517 | 8,133 | 9,818 | 4,824 | 5,751 | 24 | 29 | 17.1 | 19.2 | 18.5 | 15.5 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 10.1 | 8.2 | 12.1 | 12.9 | 11.3 | - |
| Cadila Healthcare | Pharma | 427 | 437,292 | 98,900 | 113,024 | 21,859 | 25,834 | 14,644 | 17,890 | 72 | 87 | 24.2 | 22.2 | 6.0 | 4.9 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 20.6 | 17.2 | 26.8 | 25.5 | 19.3 | 20.8 |
| Divi's Laboratories | Pharma | 1,093 | 290,263 | 37,597 | 44,330 | 14,287 | 17,067 | 10,542 | 12,606 | 40 | 47 | 22.3 | 19.6 | 27.5 | 23.0 | 6.9 | 5.6 | 20.4 | 16.9 | 24.9 | 24.4 | - | - |
| Dr Reddy's Labs. | Pharma | 4,201 | 716,297 | 159,691 | 166,993 | 40,242 | 42,249 | 26,219 | 27,125 | 154 | 159 | 15.0 | 3.5 | 27.3 | 26.4 | 5.3 | 4.4 | 18.3 | 17.0 | 19.3 | 16.9 | 13.2 | 12.2 |
| Glenmark Pharma | Pharma | 1,007 | 284,159 | 81,046 | 96,561 | 18,240 | 22,890 | 10,366 | 13,905 | 37 | 49 | 33.6 | 34.1 | 27.4 | 20.4 | 5.8 | 4.6 | 16.3 | 12.7 | 21.1 | 22.3 | 15.0 | 17.3 |
| Ipca Laboratories | Pharma | 757 | 95,486 | 30,295 | 40,884 | 4,851 | 9,675 | 1,795 | 5,460 | 14 | 44 | -32.9 | 204.2 | 52.8 | 17.4 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 21.0 | 10.6 | 7.5 | 19.1 | 7.2 | 15.9 |
| Lupin | Pharma | 2,052 | 923,748 | 14,169 | 17,805 | 3,160 | 4,060 | 2,005 | 2,520 | 25 | 31 | 57.5 | 25.7 | 82.2 | 65.4 | 12.8 | 10.8 | 292.6 | 227.8 | 16.0 | 16.9 | - | - |
| Sun Pharma | Pharma | 889 | 2,138,841 | 279,449 | 325,013 | 82,629 | 111,525 | 50,227 | 72,648 | 21 | 30 | 5.1 | 44.6 | 42.6 | 29.4 | 7.3 | 6.0 | 25.2 | 18.2 | 17.1 | 20.2 | 14.0 | 17.3 |
| CIPLA LTD | Pharma | 681 | 547,115 | 14,169 | 17,805 | 3,160 | 4,060 | 2,005 | 2,520 | 25 | 31 | 57.5 | 25.7 | 27.3 | 21.7 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 173.5 | 135.0 | 16.0 | 16.9 | - | - |
| Concor | Midcaps | 1,346 | 262,494 | 62,622 | 75,809 | 13,568 | 17,531 | 10,772 | 13,696 | 55 | 70 | 2.8 | 27.1 | 24.4 | 19.2 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 17.4 | 13.3 | 12.6 | 14.3 | 12.5 | 14.4 |
| Praj Inds. | Midcaps | 90 | 16,002 | 10,833 | 13,920 | 1,128 | 1,803 | 696 | 1,150 | 4 | 6 | 52.5 | 65.1 | 22.9 | 13.9 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 13.1 | 7.9 | 10.8 | 16.5 | 8.9 | 13.9 |
| Pennar Inds. | Midcaps | 50 | 5,963 | 15,098 | 19,470 | 1,593 | 2,235 | 517 | 835 | 4 | 7 | 44.0 | 61.6 | 11.5 | 7.1 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 4.3 | 3.1 | 11.0 | 15.6 | 15.7 | 19.1 |
| Allcargo | Midcaps | 317 | 40,025 | 63,634 | 72,953 | 5,762 | 7,150 | 2,966 | 3,772 | 24 | 30 | 23.7 | 27.2 | 13.5 | 10.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 7.3 | 5.5 | 13.7 | 15.2 | 11.7 | 13.4 |
| Sintex Industries | Midcaps | 99 | 44,276 | 83,577 | 104,860 | 14,451 | 18,165 | 6,021 | 8,572 | 14 | 19 | 9.4 | 42.4 | 7.3 | 5.2 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 6.4 | 4.7 | 11.5 | 14.2 | 7.8 | 9.2 |
| VRL Logistics Ltd | Midcaps | 412 | 37,579 | 18,632 | 21,013 | 3,134 | 3,653 | 1,266 | 1,613 | 14 | 18 | 44.6 | 27.4 | 29.7 | 23.3 | 8.4 | 6.7 | 13.1 | 11.0 | 28.4 | 28.6 | 16.9 | 19.0 |
| Havells India Ltd | Midcaps | 257 | 160,706 | 59,749 | 68,906 | 8,420 | 9,783 | 5,547 | 6,548 | 9 | 10 | 19.3 | 18.1 | 28.9 | 24.5 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 18.5 | 15.6 | 20.5 | 20.8 | 21.2 | 21.7 |
| Finolex Cables Ltd | Midcaps | 246 | 37,661 | 25,743 | 30,301 | 2,868 | 3,808 | 2,036 | 2,748 | 13 | 18 | 15.6 | 35.0 | 18.5 | 13.7 | n.a. | n.a. | 12.4 | 8.8 | 14.2 | 16.7 | 14.0 | 16.6 |
| VGuard Industries Ltd | Midcaps | 917 | 27,507 | 20,234 | 24,132 | 1,591 | 1,969 | 887 | 1,143 | 30 | 38 | 25.5 | 28.8 | 31.0 | 24.0 | n.a. | n.a. | 17.5 | 13.9 | 19.8 | 20.9 | 18.8 | 20.3 |
| Bajaj Electricals Ltd | Midcaps | 252 | 25,377 | 46,479 | 52,025 | 2,579 | 3,159 | 858 | 1,219 | 9 | 12 | -714.5 | 42.1 | 29.6 | 20.8 | n.a. | n.a. | 12.9 | 10.4 | 11.4 | 14.2 | 9.7 | 11.4 |

## Disclosures and Disclaimers

PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd. has three independent equity research groups: Institutional Equities, Institutional Equity Derivatives and Private Client Group. This report has been prepared by Institutional Equities Group. The views and opinions expressed in this document may or may not match or may be contrary at times with the views, estimates, rating, target price of the other equity research groups of PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd.

This report is issued by PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd. which is regulated by SEBI. PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd. is a subsidiary of Phillip (Mauritius) Pvt. Ltd. References to "PCIPL" in this report shall mean PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd unless otherwise stated. This report is prepared and distributed by PCIPL for information purposes only and neither the information contained herein nor any opinion expressed should be construed or deemed to be construed as solicitation or as offering advice for the purposes of the purchase or sale of any security, investment or derivatives. The information and opinions contained in the Report were considered by PCIPL to be valid when published. The report also contains information provided to PCIPL by third parties. The source of such information will usually be disclosed in the report. Whilst PCIPL has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that this information is correct, PCIPL does not offer any warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of such information. Any person placing reliance on the report to undertake trading does so entirely at his or her own risk and PCIPL does not accept any liability as a result. Securities and Derivatives markets may be subject to rapid and unexpected price movements and past performance is not necessarily an indication to future performance.

This report does not have regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person who may receive this report. Investors must undertake independent analysis with their own legal, tax and financial advisors and reach their own regarding the appropriateness of investing in any securities or investment strategies discussed or recommended in this report and should understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be realized. In no circumstances it be used or considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of any offer to buy or sell the Securities mentioned in it. The information contained in the research reports may have been taken from trade and statistical services and other sources, which we believe are reliable. PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd. or any of its group/ associate/affiliate companies do not guarantee that such information is accurate or complete and it should not be relied upon as such. Any opinions expressed reflect judgments at this date and are subject to change without notice

Important: These disclosures and disclaimers must be read in conjunction with the research report of which it forms part. Receipt and use of the research report is subject to all aspects of these disclosures and disclaimers. Additional information about the issuers and securities discussed in this research report is available on request.

Certifications: The research analyst(s) who prepared this research report hereby certifies that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect the research analyst's personal views about all of the subject issuers and/or securities, that the analyst have no known conflict of interest and no part of the research analyst's compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific views or recommendations contained in this research report. The Research Analyst certifies that he /she or his / her family members does not own the stock(s) covered in this research report.

Independence: PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd. has not had an investment banking relationship with, and has not received any compensation for investment banking services from, the subject issuers in the past twelve (12) months, and PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd does not anticipate receiving or intend to seek compensation for investment banking services from the subject issuers in the next three (3) months.

PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd is not a market maker in the securities mentioned in this research report, although it or its affiliates may hold either long or short positions in such securities. PhillipCapital (India) Pvt. Ltd does not hold more than $1 \%$ of the shares of the company(ies) covered in this report.

Suitability and Risks: This research report is for informational purposes only and is not tailored to the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular requirements of any individual recipient hereof. Certain securities may give rise to substantial risks and may not be suitable for certain investors. Each investor must make its own determination as to the appropriateness of any securities referred to in this research report based upon the legal, tax and accounting considerations applicable to such investor and its own investment objectives or strategy, its financial situation and its investing experience. The value of any security may be positively or adversely affected by changes in foreign exchange or interest rates, as well as by other financial, economic or political factors. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future performance or results.

Sources, Completeness and Accuracy: The material herein is based upon information obtained from sources that PCIPL and the research analyst believe to be reliable, but neither PCIPL nor the research analyst represents or guarantees that the information contained herein is accurate or complete and it should not be relied upon as such. Opinions expressed herein are current opinions as of the date appearing on this material and are subject to change without notice. Furthermore, PCIPL is under no obligation to update or keep the information current.

Copyright: The copyright in this research report belongs exclusively to PCIPL. All rights are reserved. Any unauthorized use or disclosure is prohibited. No reprinting or reproduction, in whole or in part, is permitted without the PCIPL's prior consent, except that a recipient may reprint it for internal circulation only and only if it is reprinted in its entirety.

Caution: Risk of loss in trading in can be substantial. You should carefully consider whether trading is appropriate for you in light of your experience, objectives, financial resources and other relevant circumstances.

For U.S. persons only: This research report is a product of PhillipCapital (India) Pvt Ltd. which is the employer of the research analyst(s) who has prepared the research report. The research analyst(s) preparing the research report is/are resident outside the United States (U.S.) and are not associated persons of any U.S. regulated broker-dealer and therefore the analyst(s) is/are not subject to supervision by a U.S. broker-dealer, and is/are not required to satisfy the regulatory licensing requirements of FINRA or required to otherwise comply with U.S. rules or regulations regarding, among other things, communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

This report is intended for distribution by PhillipCapital (India) Pvt Ltd. only to "Major Institutional Investors" as defined by Rule 15a-6(b) (4) of the U.S. Securities andExchange Act, 1934 (the Exchange Act) and interpretations thereof by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in reliance on Rule 15a 6(a)(2). If the recipient of this report is not a Major Institutional Investor as specified above, then it should not act upon this report and return the same to the sender. Further, this report may not be copied, duplicated and/or transmitted onward to any U.S. person, which is not the Major Institutional Investor.

In reliance on the exemption from registration provided by Rule 15a6 of the Exchange Act and interpretations thereof by the SEC in order to conduct certain business with Major Institutional Investors, PhillipCapital (India) Pvt Ltd. has entered into an agreement with a U.S. registered broker-dealer, Marco Polo Securities Inc. ("Marco Polo").Transactions in securities discussed in this research report should be effected through Marco Polo or another U.S. registered broker dealer

It gives us great pleasure to invite you to
on Thursday, 3rd December 2015 at Sofitel Hotel, BKC, Mumbai

Panel Discussion: 10am - 12pm | Lunch: 12 - 1 pm | Group Meetings: 1 - 6 pm

## SESSION 1

Panel Discussion Participants

- Surjit Kumar Chaudhary,

Secretary, Ministry of C\&PC

- Samir Biswas,

Joint Secretary, Ministry of C\&PC

- Manish Panchal,

Head of Chemicals, Tata Strategic Management

- Rajendra Gogri,

MD, Aarti Industries Itd

- Belur Krishnamurthy Sethuram,

MD, Celanese Chemical India

- Dr. Dileep M. Wakankar,

Head Product Stewardship, Archroma India

- Sunil Lalbhai,

Chairman and Managing Director of Atul*

## SESSION 2

Group Meetings Participants

- Ministry of Chem \& Petro. Chem. (Joint Secretary, Ministry of C\&PC)
- Aarti Industries
- Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals
- BASF*
- NOCIL
- Meghmani Organics
- Omkar Specialty
- Deepak Nitrite
- Camlin*
- Shree Pushkar*
- Fineotex Chem

Please revert with your interest at the earliest. We eagerly look forward to welcoming you to PhillipCapital India "Speciality Chemicals Investors' Day"


# Some equities show 

 attractive value.
## Talk to Phillip

## Identify investment

## opportunities.

40 years 16 countries

## 1 million clients

USD 33.5 billion assets*
We are adding new clients, new accounts and new assets everyday

Talk to us on 02224831919 Toll free no.: 1800221331


[^0]:    - Satnam Arora, Managing Director, Kohinoor Foods.

[^1]:    Source: RBI, CSO, CGA, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of commerce, Bloomberg, PhillipCapital India Research

